

The Interpretive Turn: Radical Hermeneutics and the Work of Architecture

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THE INTERPRETIVE TURN

This paper will explore the question of "interpretation" in an effort to connect the ontological insights of philosophical hermeneutics with the practices of interpretive disciplines, with particular reference to architecture. The "theory" of interpretation as a philosophical problem already considers the "practices" of engagement with the life-world, thus implying understandings of "works" of art or architecture within that world. I will outline new insights for architectural criticism, history, and education arising from three aspects of this worldly, interpretive "being" and activity: its *contextuality*, its *interactivity*, and its *temporality*.

All knowing, indeed human existence itself, both conforms to language and consists of interpretation. This radical claim reveals the terms of the growing and shifting foci among philosophical preoccupations of the modern era. Two hundred years ago, when philosophy left its metaphysical emphasis and took an epistemological turn,¹ enlightenment science was the model for the conditions and characteristics of *knowledge*. The linguistic turn, in the first two-thirds of this century, looked instead to language for models of the structure and characteristics of *meaning*. Both of these, science and linguistics, were in their day influential on other fields including architecture.

Most recently the interpretive turn, with cues from both recent philosophy of science and literary criticism, looks to the characteristics of *interpretive activity*—how we engage with the things and phenomena of the world.² With the demise of idealism and positivism (without firm models of knowledge or of meaning) we are left to consider the contingent, social, and historical *activities* by which we encounter the world.

This review is clearly broad-brush, and the purpose of this essay is not to fill out such a history of modern philosophical thought. But other disciplines, in self-conscious reflection, have taken up insights from this interpretive turn—law, theology, history, literary theory, and even science. These disciplines, in which some sort of "practice" takes place in the "real world" of discourse or of society, have actually

provided those questions and those examples whereby interpretive theory has refined itself and enlarged its influence. It is the aim of this essay to suggest ways that this turn might also be important for architecture, and architecture important for it. So although in its pure form, as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer,³ philosophical hermeneutics is at the level of pure ontological reflection, it becomes productive as well as legitimate to let it illuminate a field such as architecture⁴ (as a practice embedded in the social world) since it is an understanding of just such embeddedness which is distinctive about this ontology.

RADICAL HERMENEUTICS

Interpretation is not just *something we do*, it is *how we are*, the nature of our existence. The basis of the interpretive turn is the recognition, prevalent now throughout continental hermeneutic⁵ philosophy and creditable ultimately to Heidegger, that radically, fundamentally, interpretation is the very structure of our being. We are continuously involved in a world⁶ within which we relate with all other entities, including our own pasts and goals, through the activity of interpreting. Every moment of our existence consists of interpreting, from the moment we awaken and read the alarm clock and see the color of the sky outside. Interpretation is the universal ubiquitous feature of all human activity and being.

This interpretive mode of being has a structure with specific, relevant characteristics: We are always embedded in the world with our tasks, motives, and desires. Everything is encountered in a background context of networks of relations, traditions, meanings, ways of life, shared practices—in short, a "world." Our "being-in-the-world among things and among others is also dynamically between our past and our future." My account here will limit itself to explaining that this "finding-ourselves-already-being-in-the-world" entails three aspects—it is always *contextual*, always *interactive*, and always *temporal*. In other words, we are always *in* a world of relationships and involvements, we are always relating *with* entities in dialog and mutual influence,

and we are always projecting toward future possibilities (from out of a remembered past). From each of these three, and together, we can infer significant implications for our understanding of architecture, our activity of encountering and interpreting it, both in the teaching and in the making. (In architectural education, one thinks of history, theory, design criticism, or the way in which a particular work of architecture is set out as an interpretation of its context or of the social and cultural world.)

THE WORK, OR TEXT, OF ARCHITECTURE

"Works" of architecture are already actively "at work" for us within this structure of encounter and understanding. Hermeneutic theory, since its focus is on our activity of engagement, already understands the "work" inside the context of that engagement. Thus it already contains a working-out of major questions with which we have struggled in architectural discourse. In law, theology, and literature, those fields in which hermeneutics have been actively considered now for decades, that which is consciously, deliberately interpreted is of course a text—specifically, texts that come down from former times, standing within an acknowledged tradition, and are taken to be of some interest to the present concern. The questions arising from the reflective coming-to-terms with these texts include: applicability of the text to the larger world of life and its concerns, the influence of the text and its interpretation on the flow of discourse, and the processes of continuity, revision, and criticism regarding the text and the themes it is taken to involve. Clearly, these will all apply to the discourse of architecture too, as it comes to address and define and explore the significance of its "texts."

In unfolding the implications of this theory for architectural understanding, let me offer the idea of the "work" in place of the "text". In these other disciplines, the "medium" is obviously textual, whereas in architecture, any implications that its works are analogous to those in verbal language would here only be distracting.⁸ Instead, I will play on the word "work" and its ambiguity as both a noun and a verb.⁹ First, the work is of course already understood as a "thing made" by human effort ("work") and volition. Yet in coming forward out of its world of origin and somehow arising for us as being of interest, the "work" is already "at work" *for* us. It is pressing itself on our attention along with, at least by inference, the world of its origination. It opens up its world, presents its context to us, to our own context of concerns. Second, it is already "at work" offering comparison, negotiation, and influence within our own contexts of involvement. Third, it is already "at work" as that thing through which and on the basis of which we both already have and understand our tradition, and find it possible to decide on our future action with critical resolve. The "worlung" of the "work" thus brings it within the contextual, interactive, and temporal aspects of our interpretive activity (By extension, "work" could as easily mean a written text contributive of

architectural discourse, or even the discipline of architecture as a whole, since these are both conceivable only with reference to an accumulation of "works" and "texts".)

THE WORK IS NOT AN "AESTHETIC" "OBJECT"

Our habit of "viewing" the work as an "object" or as an "aesthetic" concern must be put to rest. Methods grounded ultimately in science (such as formal analysis or stylistic categorization) still dominate much of our interpretive practice, generally operating from the presupposition that the work is "out there" apart from us, with some kind of "objective" reality to which we may gain access through analytical methods. And in the arts, that reality is most often presupposed to consist of "aesthetic" concerns of form, sensation, content, or style, which we as "subjects" may explicate. But hermeneutic theory rejects fundamentally the subject-object dichotomy, emphasizing instead that we are always already engaged with the work in question and that any "objectifying" of the work is a curtailment of meaningful involvements that were already at work.

In architectural historical interpretation, for example, the lack of a sense of relevance is often bemoaned by students, yet probably just such a curtailment of works as "aesthetic objects" is a cause. The categorizing of the work as an "object" and the circumscribing of its concerns as "aesthetic" work precisely against engagement, because they pull against the understanding that fully involved, engaged interpretive encounters are already "how we are."

Hans-Georg Gadamer has advanced a thorough critique of modern aesthetic consciousness,¹⁰ describing how it presupposes a mode of experience that does not correspond to the way in which, as humans, we for the most part *are*—always in a mode of contextual, interactive, temporal engagement. For architecture, it could equally be argued that such a methodological curtailment does not correspond to the way in which architecture for the most part *is*—embedded in the life-ways and practices of the social and cultural world, responding to such everyday matters as climate and use. Gadamer's principle of "aesthetic non-differentiation" points up the artificiality of isolating so-called "aesthetic experience" from other more pragmatic and pre-reflective realms, or from the awareness and interaction of the interpreter's own world and aims, or from the flow of time. "Aesthetics" does not open up the "in", the "with", and the "toward/from" that are the inherent structure of our interpretive "being".

This emphasis on the embeddedness of the "aesthetic" in the whole world of concerns that constitute our existence does not deny that something special accrues to art, to the artwork, or to the fruits of artistic ambition. Indeed art-works have an especially powerful capacity to act on us and influence our understandings, and to illuminate and critique our life-world and its practices.

So the practice of curtailment of art as "aesthetics" and works as "objects" does a grave disservice to those of us who would continue to claim that architecture is art. For it follows from

this objectification that our works need not have such influence; that art is not knowledge, that it has no necessary place in the world of life, or that its formal sensations are its sufficient reason for being. The felt "holiness" of art thus has no justification in terms of the fullness of the social and cultural world. For Gadamer and Heidegger, the work of art instead opens up a world, reveals truth, engages and broadens our own horizons, challenges our own world and self-understanding, so that we see the world in a new way. With a great work, our whole self-understanding is risked, and it is not we who are interrogating an "object", but the "work" is at "work" on us—putting questions to us, challenging us within the whole context of our world and our self-understanding. The old watch-word "relevance" is now seen as much too weak; the encounter with the art work is now fully in the manner of, and infiltrates, our very being.

Aesthetic readings of art separate form from truth. *Paradise Lost* is presupposed to be formally great but ultimately not "true." This judgment is valid only when the work is viewed "objectively"—ripped out of its life-world and presumed to have little to do with our present concerns. In such a curtailment, we presuppose the present "truth" to be correct, and in this distancing, we presuppose that the present should not be put to the test by having its prejudgments risked by an open, interactive dialogue with other "truths", another life-world as brought to us in the work.

WE ARE NOT A DETACHED "SUBJECT"

Our encounter with the work and its world is already shaped by our concerns; so just as it can not be a detached "object" we cannot be an uninvolved "Subject". Hermeneutic theory, by emphasizing the *activity* of understanding, reveals it to be an historical "event". That is, it occurs at a particular time and place, in a certain context, with and for a certain community, and within the active ongoing, transforming influence of a tradition or heritage—to which both it and the work, as now interpreted, may themselves contribute.

The work's significance is always present in the encounter itself, which included already the way that the work arose as being of interest to us. Our tools and processes for understanding are already in operation, some from our basic life-world and human existence, others from the discourse of our interpretive community.¹² Thus there can be no presuppositionless understanding, no direct apprehension of what is, in and of itself. The hermeneutic "as" is the inevitable structure whereby things are always embedded in our aims, methods, intentions, and so on; and these relations are already in place when we see and know the thing "as" something. As an art-work, for example, it is already loaded with our presuppositions as to what the characteristics of art-works are. (That is not to say that those presuppositions are not continually shifted by other encounters; that they are and should be is just what this essay is claiming.)

Even as it first arises for us as being of interest, the significance of a past work is thus already being defined by

the questions put to it by the present context of inquiry. And our context of inquiry, with its presuppositions, comes from our tradition, which is already the fabric of relations, the horizon, within which we do our thinking. All understanding is thus already placed in history, the temporal dimension of our being, and can understand the past only by broadening its horizon to take in the thing encountered. (Even in science, the meaning of a particular experiment does not come from the interplay of elements in the experiment itself, but from the tradition of interpretation in which it stands—how it arose as an important question and got framed, the historical paradigm at work, and future possibilities it opens up.)

ARCHITECTURE BEYOND "OBJECT" AND "SUBJECT"

So a Greek Temple, for example, is not an "object", its interest for us need not be curtailed as merely "aesthetic", and we are not mere "subjects" by which its autonomous properties, true reality, or correct meanings may be perceived.¹³ Instead, the temple is a work; it arises from within a world and is there, made present to ours. It comes to us from out of a context of life, in which the sun rises and sets, in which ritual practices are enacted, in which conversations and daily life occur, and in which the rain falls. It is thick and hard, and it stands out from among other buildings, yet within its temenos wall; it contrasts and focuses the surrounding landscape. It embodies a tradition which links it, even in its own world, to a distant past, and it projects refinements and possibilities for that tradition. The work opens up and reveals a world.¹⁴ We already understand the humanity of its makers, we infer their motives at least insofar as they were, like us, alive on the earth and involved in social and institutional relationships and amidst natural phenomena. We already understand that in their life-world they were themselves interpreting and temporal; they lived and moved and established and envisioned their individual and collective identities, their cultural practices and social lives.

The building is a "thing made" which still can call forth and connect us with a world in which makers and users and patrons and observers and interpreters played out their full human possibilities in terms of their pasts and futures—in short which structured their human existence. That we already understand the basic structure of such being-in-the-world is what enables us already to understand the work, to begin to bring it into comparison, into interactive dialogue, with our own world. We are able to listen for the questions it can pose to us, not only seek answers to the questions we pose to it.

Our encounter with the work is itself an historical moment grounded in our own world. This is what enables the work to speak, and us to begin the activity of interpreting. The hermeneutic "as" is already "at work"—we take it "as" a Greek temple, with all that this already entails.

But of course, "this" is not the temple at all. It is a projected slide of the partially re-erected ruins of a rectangu-

lar structure, thought to be a temple, which I took on my vacation in Greece in 1983, deliberately in the deep shadows of the late afternoon, and after most of the tourists had gone back to the village, to prepare for dinners on open terraces hanging over this very same valley. In that sentence alone there are at least eight filtering presuppositions that already have influenced our encounter. The temple is already, in many ways, "for us." It has no objective reality apart from the "as's" which bring it to us: *as* the birth of the classical canon of architecture, *as* a romantic icon of "the glory that was Greece," *as* a task of modern archaeology, or *as* an object of modern tourism.

So what are the virtues of a reflective consciousness about those influences, those "already's", that hermeneutic theory opens up to us—~~the~~ values and practices, those conventions of discourse or representation, those complex but semi-transparent webs which are the life-worlds in which both we and the work are embedded? The answer to that question will emerge in my concluding sections.

INTERPRETATION IS A DIALOGUE OF QUESTIONING

The structure of our being-as-interpretation is both *contextual* (in a full complex world of involvements, both ours and the work's) and also *interactive* (a process of negotiation and mutual influencing). Interpretation is not a matter between a "subject" and an "object" in which the inquirer devises "methods" for getting at the work. The work instead is regarded as already standing in experience, and posing questions to the inquirer. There within overall experience, through a dialectical process, the work breaks through the tendency of "method" to prestructure (or circumscribe) the way of encountering.¹⁵ Texts and works are voices from the past to be brought to life through dialogue not "analysis", interactive influence not "method".

Gadamer offers an open, reverent "*I-Thou*" relationship we should cultivate with the work. Though dialogue entails questioning, it is not to be a questioning that threatens or undermines the work. Though the questions posed to the work are indicating a certain direction (without which the answer could make no sense) we remain open to the answer, whatever it may be. And where do the questions themselves arise from in this process? From immersion in the work and its worlds, its backgrounds, the already-operating relations in which we find ourselves with it. We move from there to question the world of the work, to pose the question to which the work itself may have been an answer. These are drawn from the present interpreter's horizon,¹⁶ yet in posing them to the work, we open ourselves to the influence of the work and its world. Our own horizon needs broadening until it can receive the other, whereupon the fusion of one with the other can then illuminate the present world of the interpreter with fresh insight.

It is crucial that the possibilities in the present are "held open" to the influence of the tradition as revealed by the work. The tradition, since it also constitutes the present,

enables the posing of the questions, while yet it also stands open and vulnerable to the truth claims of the past work. This openness to the "otherness" of the past work puts us in a particularly energized relationship with history.

OUR HISTORICALITY IS A FUTURAL, CRITICAL PROJECT

All knowledge, all meaning, and all activity are based on a foundation of *past* experience which is structured by us in the *present* as a projection of *future* possibilities. This is our "historicality" as laid out by Heidegger. The implications for historical inquiry (any interpretation of past works) thus become acute, as we are well beyond the reach of usual debates about its "relevance". "Historicality" in this sense is the very ground and nature of our being, as well as the context for any reflective act of interpretation. For Gadamer, history is not a pile of facts which can be made an "object" of consciousness, but rather a stream in which we move and participate in every act of encounter or understanding. There is no pure seeing of history that is not always an understanding through a consciousness standing in the present, and the present is always understood through the intentions, patterns, and preconceptions brought from the past, embedded in the tradition in which we inescapably stand and through which we exist. The life-world, and all understandings which arise from within it, have "historicality" as their very structure.

This leads Gadamer to the radical insight that understanding the text is always already applying it.¹⁷ Juridical and theological hermeneutics are the clear models of how the distance is spanned between the text in its origin and the present interpretive situation. Legal precedents and biblical texts are taken to have a governing claim on the present in the way that best models how our tradition operates in our daily existence. The texts are interpreted simultaneously within their contexts of origin and within their capacity to guide life and practice in the present. Though interpreted in the present, the present is not allowed to overpower and dominate the interpretation. The present is held open, the horizon widens to the influence of the tradition, the work, and through interpretation it is seen to reveal a truth which is still of value. A "method" is not applied, as much as the interpreter's *thinking* is itself adjusted to the influence of the text. Most radically, there is a willingness to risk the presumptions of the present to the truth that the past work might uncover—to risk modification rather than mastery. The present is not the apex of truth, and our encounters with works from the tradition are received and accumulate as "experience", not as "objective knowledge" or "correct meaning".

This conception of history describes a relationship between *past* and *present*. But as Heidegger has shown, the present is even more radically constituted by the *future*. Our being-as-interpreting is driven by a *futural orientation* (our projection of possibilities) as much as it is grounded in the past (our accumulated experiences).

Those human beings who left us the works from the past were existing, like us, in a mode of projecting their future possibilities out of their world and tradition. Thus the "authentic historicity"¹⁸ of any given thing from the past does not consist of its chronological location in time, or its status as data or objects, but rather in its "having-been" in a world where human beings were so projecting. Recognizing that we share this mode of being, we already have a way of interpreting the work as a having-been, that is, as a having-projected from within a world and a tradition.

We also have therefore a way of appropriating that having-been within our own world, in part since it is also already understood as a work within our own tradition. But this appropriating, for Heidegger, is to be critically reflective and resolute. He calls it a "repetition". "But when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been, the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again." In other words, we do not "revive" the past or its works, nor return to a condition that has already been superseded in any way. "Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives."¹⁹ In other words, the past is reciprocally engaged, critically questioned, decisively taken up; and neither the past nor the future are embraced or valorized in themselves. The tradition, and its works, are a resource for the advancement of possibilities, not a dictator, a refuge, or a seducer.

The past is important because and to the extent that we *project our futures* out of our finding ourselves within and constituted by our tradition, including the specific possibilities discoverable in the "worlds-which-have-been-there". The authentic history of the having-been-there is "disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factual existence—in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its futural character."²⁰ Insights from the past can be put to use creatively and critically in the present, as a projecting toward a futural possibility. (Scholarly history itself already presupposes this at some level, insofar as, the arising of scholarly historical inquiry comes out of an already operating historical sense, the conditioned temporality of the historian-in-her-world.)

The presentness of today can be overcome by a critical-historical denial of, and release from, its inevitability, by insights brought resolutely from the past in futural projection. History in this sense reveals how things *might be otherwise*, through the resolute, futural projections of the present.

CONCLUSIONS

"It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline

acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people."²¹

Heidegger's discussion of the Greek Temple (in "The Origin of the Work of Art") we now recognize as much more than a "soft" poetic reverie. It interprets the temple as a *work*, allowing it to "work" in the fullest sense—by opening up and revealing a world that, although for us, is distinctly foreign. Yet it is somehow not "untrue". Despite its difference, we are held open to that world by the work, through the process of interpretation. Our own horizons expand as we question and approach the ways it may become "true" for us. It does not curtail the work as "form" or "style" or "symbol", yet neither does it exclude these as important content for our interpretations. Rather, it locates these issues within the broadened, fused horizons of larger world-contextual and temporal understanding.

Open exposure and intimate dialogue with others, other works, and other worlds (all of which we may find are already embedded in our tradition) is our only way of clearing out a space in the present, of enabling the resolute criticism of current practices. Such historicity and critical activity is already, at an ontological level, our mode of being; and it is only a question of our reflective self-consciousness of such interpretive activity that we enrich our interpretive disciplines in this direction. Bringing the works of our tradition close, with their worlds, we subject ourselves to their influence in critical resolution.

It is the work of art, the temple, that focuses and reveals the meanings and relationships that constituted its world. The work "works" in its revealing of this world. But this is more than an antiquarian exercise, however fully our conception of the relational complexity of that world may be drawn out. And it is certainly not a call to revive the politics, rituals, or forms, of the classical age. Heidegger, in the context of his essay, is using the temple-work and its capacity to reveal its world as *philosophical example*. This example has an ultimate goal: to project a new, *futural possibility for the understanding of art*, to open up a critical space amidst present conventions and practices, to reveal the poverty of aesthetic and objective analysis, and to radically reconfigure our understanding of the work of art, and hence of our world and the future of our discourse.

The interpretive activity, modeled on our mode of being, opens itself to works and contexts, opens its horizons into a dialogue of influence, and opens a critical space in which projections of future discourse may be realized.

NOTES

¹ David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and Richard Shusterman, editors, *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) I am indebted to this text for my title, as well as for the concise summary of these developments provided in the editors' introduction.

- ² Most prominently for science in Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrove, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970). For literature, see most usefully Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969); and Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge, 1980).
- ³ I will be drawing the philosophical resources from a reading of two of the most profoundly influential texts of the twentieth century: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994). The growing influence of these texts is attested to by the proliferation of secondary works which explore their ideas and advocate their influence for certain specific discourses and practices—most notably so far science, theology, law, and literary criticism.
- ⁴ Much has been done in the fruitful interchange recently between architecture and deconstruction. I offer here the outline of a comparable exchange with hermeneutics.
- ⁵ The Greek roots of the word "hermeneutic" involve a "bringing to understanding" through language, a bringing out from a divine or the otherwise distant or incomprehensible source, something that needs to be made relevant and available to understanding. The meaning in Greek takes three branches—to say, to explain, and to translate—which are related but with differing emphases. Its tradition of application has been most closely connected with biblical interpretation, the bringing forward of sacred texts for which, as in jurisprudence also, there is already a presupposed relevance, a strong claim by the text, upon one's life and involvements in the present.
- ⁶ The term "world" throughout this essay will mean, after Heidegger, the complete web or network of things, meanings, and relationships in which human existence finds itself involved, with its aims, motives, responsibilities, structures, and practices.
- ⁷ Heidegger's term for our human "being" in this sense is "Dasein", but I will avoid his neologism in favor of simply "human existence" or "being". See *op. cit.*, sections 9-13.
- ⁸ Though the linguistic analogy has an esteemed tradition in architectural theory, the general aim of this essay is to move outside the "linguistic" model of architectural content.
- ⁹ This, of course, is the tack in Martin Heidegger's brilliant essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 15-87), in which the phrase, "the work works" is elaborately elucidated.
- ¹⁰ Gadamer, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-100. Also Palmer, *op. cit.*, chapter 11.
- ¹¹ Heidegger's exploration of the idea of "truth" is itself, within the discourse of philosophy, an act of authentic historicity of the kind I describe in my conclusions here. Critical of the effects of the instrumental-rationalist conception of truth (as the "correspondence" to "objective reality") he interpreted an earlier, pre-Socratic conception of truth as an "unconcealing out of concealment" or a "revealing"—an opening up of possibilities. From the past came an idea to critique the conventions of the present.
- ¹² "Interpretive communities" is a phrase from Stanley Fish, who describes the degree to which interpretation is conditioned by the shared conventions that are always operating and generally most convincing within any discourse at a given time. These would of course include the community's presuppositions regarding art, life, time, value, institutions, power, and so on. See his *Is there a Text in this Class?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 338-346.
- ¹³ Hermeneutic theory, in its contextual, interactive, and temporal dimensions, also refutes dualisms. "Subject-object" is the most essential of these; but through its conception of "interpretation-as-activity-already-embedded-in-the-world" it could help blur and surround others common in the conventions of architectural discussion such as: theory-practice, history-theory, art-science, or form-meaning.
- ¹⁴ Heidegger elaborates this in all its complexity in "Origin..." pp. 41-43.
- ¹⁵ Gadamer's title, *Truth and Method*, is ironic and ambiguous, since his point is that "method" is not the way to "truth."
- ¹⁶ "Horizon" is Gadamer's term for the world, background, context, see *op. cit.*, pp. 302-307.
- ¹⁷ Gadamer, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-309.
- ¹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, sections 73-76.
- ¹⁹ *ibid.*
- ²⁰ *ibid.*
- ²¹ Heidegger, "Origin..." page 42.