

Technology and Time: Key Notions for an Ethics of Architecture

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INTRODUCTION: ORIENTATIONS AND DIRECTIONS

I want to start with the "Conference Overview" and how it already says a great deal about ways in which we are able to say with simplicity and lack of ambiguity "technology and architecture." In its brevity and, indeed, in its openness, its consensual arousing of issues or debates, this overview does in fact set for us a rather rigid framework, but one that is neither surprising nor novel.' We may look momentarily at the prepositional play of architecture and technology as their adjacency is announced. Initially we have "Perspectives on Architectural Technology" where we recognise an adjectival "architecture," an architecture that belongs to and qualifies technology. And, at the same moment there is the possibility of having a number of orientations to or views upon this entity, one may have "perspectives on" this qualified technology. As we can see, the issue, question or concern with place and position, with who sees and sees what, has already been framed in this brief sub-title, but framed in a most definite way, we could say in the most naturalised of ways, in the way whereby the name, term or designated entity "architectural technology" is taken as given. What gives? What gives here? Which is to say, in another way, what's up? What slides from under us? Prepositions, placements, positions are rebounding everywhere, multiplying our perspectives on the nature of a qualification to technology, to the capacity to say or a wanting to say that there is, indeed, something we name technology which is or can be qualified by architecture. What is technology's nature? Do we entertain perspectives on natural technology?

A little into the conference overview, there's another prepositional logic: "technology in architecture." One sees the reverse here, the turning inside-out, not so much a shift in perspective or of perspective, but apassing through the virtual plane to enter the other side of the image. Technology in architecture, architecture in technology. Please, you are saying, don't get so pedantic on a couple of semantic slides. The prepositional logic is not the point at issue, you might say; at issue is not a discursive register, but rather effects in the world, where technology has its exercise of power. But, I'm

not so sure here, not so sure that we can point any finger at technology and say its doing this or doing that. I'm not sure that technology is in the world in this way. But then, in what way is it in the world, and what is it whereby it exists? Curiously, it is the discourse of architecture that may most carefully access this question, concerned as it is with the question of dwelling, residing, and how one dwells. And, coincidentally, it is the discourse of ethics which may help us in accessing the further question of the manner by which something is in the world. Thus, in as much as technology resides, there is a certain architectural excavation as to place and region, and in as much as technology has effects, there is an ethical question as to its capacity to effect.

Technology, Time and Ethics

Then what is technology and its relation to architecture and their relation to ethics? I suggest that we cannot adequately develop an account of the relation between these entities without considered thinking about time. It is my contention that technology is neither some essential means objectified into instruments, equipment, materials, systems, data flows and so on, nor a measure of capacity to account for change, but rather time's manner of apprehension. Three points need to be made to qualify this enigmatic statement. Firstly, I am not inferring an anthropomorphism of time, as if time apprehends. Secondly, I am considering here on the one hand a notion of temporality developed by the philosopher Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time*, the intrinsically mortal project constitutive of *Dasein*, and on the other his notion of technology as that which in modernity enframes our existence. Thirdly, in considering a question of time and technology I am not undertaking an historical enquiry into successive modes of developments of architecture and technology.

In my discussion of this I will be focusing on the recent publication by Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, in relation to architecture, ethics and time, particularly with respect to the way Harries activates the thinking of Heidegger on dwelling and technology.? Architecture and temporality has, to my knowledge, been addressed only somewhat obliquely or indirectly,' though in the

writings of Harries we may see a direct address to the issue:

I have called the connection between technology and perennial Platonism a natural alliance, natural because both are born of the same ill will against time. To support this claim, let me begin by positing—with Nietzsche, from whom I took the expression "ill will against time"—a will to power in human beings, coupled with a recognition that we never have enough power to secure our existence, that we are subject to time, vulnerable and mortal.⁴

As well, crucial to this paper is a contestation of Harries' humanist ethics, and his voluntarist approach to technology subtending from this. Such ethics is countered by an approach developed from the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and John Caputo.

This paper does not allow me to engage in a developed account of philosophies of time.⁵ This goes for ethics as well. It is not a small issue, and one that has never quite left the side of architectural discourses, always being there as a reasonable ground for answering the question "why are you doing that?" or, as with so many accounts of architecture, why has it failed yet again to deliver its promise, its obligation, its duty.⁶ What I want to do here is a little smaller, immediate and contained, and yet, as I hope, it will present some careful thinking on what technology is and what its relation to architecture might be.⁷ And in this, I hope to give some critical account of an ethics, which if an ethics is to mean anything, is also the time of our *ethos*. And I want to do this by looking closely at Harries' *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, because this book is, at once, an important work but also a most troubling one. In a conference on technology and architecture, this close focus on Harries is hopefully understood not as a detour but rather as an opening to some important questions on an ethics of technology.

The Ethical Function of Architecture

A first question, perhaps, should be: is this a book concerning technology?⁸ Does technology get discussed at all? Isn't it a book by a philosopher about ethical thinking in architecture? And yet what struck me, from my initial encounter with the book and its title, is the extent to which technology operates like an unmoved mover, a first principle, a first cause, one that is so omnipresent that it can order everything without ever really being noticed. One need only begin by asking what does "function" mean in the title "The Ethical Function of Architecture." Does ethics function? What is "function"? Does Harries ever mention it, discuss it, comment on it? Is there an ethics to "function"? Do "function" and "technology" have a history, a neighbourhood, an intimacy? These questions, my immediate questions on encountering the book, left an *aporia* which unsettled the project Harries set in place.

And what is this project? It starts in two places, or rather, with what I would term ascertain Aristotelian relation between contained and container. And the spatial register here is crucial: "For some time now architecture has been uncertain

of its way." Architecture is lost (again), left the path (in the singular). There is a way, and architecture for some time has been uncertain of it. Lost in space. Harries has two points of departure in defining the boundary to the problem. The first is its horizon or surround, its container, and this is the issue of *ethos* and architecture. *Ethos* names the way human beings exist in the world, their way of dwelling. We have lost our way of dwelling. The second point of departure is in defining the limits to the problem, the limits to that which is contained or bounded, and this is achieved by Harries collapsing together two architectural traditions, those of Pevsner and Venturi into a singular object, the "decorated shed."¹⁰

Then we see a double move with this doubled beginning. The first point of departure becomes an "ethical approach" to architecture, the second an "aesthetic approach."¹¹ Yet they do not operate at the same level nor refer to the same entities. The aesthetic approach is able to designate things, name buildings, architects, provide formulae: work of architecture = building + decoration. There is an empirical datum, one can point to it.¹² But the ethical approach does not operate at the same level or plane of consistency. You cannot point to this empirically given *ethos*. Harries is here taking up a project he valued in the work of Sigfried Giedion, inscribed into *Space, Time and Architecture*, that the main task of architecture was "the interpretation of a way of life valuable for our period."¹³ This is, as well, we should remember, the Giedion of *Technology Takes Command*.¹⁴ But how does Harries construe that small slide from "ethical approach" to "ethical function." In one respect, it's all Giedion's doing. Harries says, and I will quote the text in full here:

Despite such questions [What is the way of life valid for our period; is there a way of life valid for all.?] I find it difficult to surrender Giedion's modernist hope. Should architecture not help us find our place and way in an ever more disorienting world? In this sense I shall speak of the *ethical function* of architecture. "Ethical" derives from "ethos." By a person's ethos we mean his or her character, nature, or disposition. Similarly we speak of a community's ethos, referring to the spirit that presides over its activities. "Ethos" here names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling. By the ethical function of architecture I mean its task to help articulate a common ethos.¹⁵

In this regard, Harries could have also spoken of an "aesthetic function" of architecture, where its task would have been concerned with an articulation of formalist interests or even creative genius.¹⁶ "Function" relates to the presence of a "task" such as the "its task" of architecture. Questions abound. Is it up to the task? What is the task? Has it ever been up to the task? But then, is task and obligation the same thing? Is architecture obliged, called up to do this? Does architecture have the freedom to choose, and is it any less architecture for refusing, if indeed it has a choice? Giedion and Harries might well say it has seldom, if ever, performed. But performative evidence presents something of a problem. Every turn to this

or that empirically given building with its proper name reinvokes the plane of consistency we more familiarly associate with Harries' "aesthetic function." Indeed, what can be invoked from the empirical when demarcating an "ethos," a "disposition" or "character"?¹⁷

Two points need to be made here. Firstly, we may see in Harries' privileging of an ethical approach to an aesthetic approach a resonance with Heidegger's concern with an overcoming of aesthetics, particularly revealed in his "The Origin of the Work of Art." Such aesthetics was marked by a psychological nature with its focus on the subjective feeling instantiated by aesthetic experience. It is this psychological subject and its experiential world that was so much the target for Heidegger. Secondly, we may understand how this is played out for Harries in his differentiation between "representation" and "re-presenting" (with a hyphen). Representation invokes the subject of aesthetic experience, for whom the world is experienced as object, whereas the task of architecture is to re-present the ideal, where the ideal is attended-to as a call to authentic dwelling. Thus, for example Harries suggests: "as a re-presentation of buildings, architecture re-presents and lets us attend to that "speech"."¹⁸

And this is why, perhaps, Harries is more comfortable with Joseph Rykwert's Adamic man, and that slide across a pre- and post-lapsarian bar. For Harries, Rykwert's story of Adam's house in Paradise is exemplary:

Adam's house mediated between his embodied self and his environment. As this mediation, this house has to be thought of both as a figure of Adam's body and at the same time as a figure of paradise. And must we not require such mediation of all building that would answer to the requirements of dwelling?¹⁹

What is this mediation? This is what intrigues me. This is the mediation that would be required of "function" were it to be given the task of moving between an aesthetic approach and an ethical approach, such that we could demarcate a difference between the aesthetic and the ethical at all in relation to their difference to the same, that is, to their commonality in function. Function is the mediating term. And what does it mediate, bridge, link, determine the safe passage of, orient the way for? "Function" here plays the neat role of bridging human and cosmic orders.

Concerning Technology

What is the "task" like nature of architecture, in the sense that it is charged with the task of interpreting our *ethos*. There are two questions which I want to keep separate here, though they form the kernel of this paper. With this notion of "task" there are two concerns: one concern is with the work-like nature of the task: what is it; how is it done? The other concern is with the question of obligation: why do it? What sets it? We will see how these two excavations of the task-ness of task lead us to consider the twin issues of technology and time, and the extent to which technology and time may become twin poles for approaching an ethics of architecture. Initially I want to

work with the first of these concerns, the "what is it?" of the task.

Harries, in fact, leaps at it all too quickly, unfolds it all at once, and in this collapses the questions together. And it is this that buries "function" for Harries, buries any concerned questioning of the task-like nature of the task. Indeed, it brings about the most extraordinary omission in what is the central archaeology of the book. And all of this concerns technology, and architecture. It unfolds like this, in a relay between Hegel and Heidegger:²⁰ Time, as Hegel's "history," marks the emancipation of humanity from its enslavement to nature, that is to say, it is the progress of technology. The "terror of time," the fleeting and contingent, is surpassed by the "cunning of Reason."²¹ But Hegel's story has an unhappy ending for architecture, an ending that Harries does not quite want to endure, and this is the moment, inevitable and inexorable, when architecture is surpassed as the highest expression of Spirit, when architecture, too, is surpassed in the emancipation of humanity, and surpassed by higher forms of Spirit in religion and then in philosophy. Hence Hegel's famous pronouncement on the death of art. This, too, is the terror of time, we could say, for the philosopher whose approach to architecture and ethics hinges on an unsurpassable moment for architecture. Harries says:

More immediately and more fully than any other art, architecture, as Hegel recognised, re-presents the essential strife between spirit and matter, mirroring the essential strife within the human being as the *animal rationale*. The modern world, to the extent that it is ruled by the Cartesian project to render the human being the master and possessor of nature, would be rid of such strife, not recognising that values, even as they are acknowledged, endorsed, and pruned by the *ratio*, claim us only as long as they yet retain their roots in the earth. Architecture is needed to recall the human being to the whole self: to the *animal* and to the *ratio*, to nature and spirit.?

The "strife" referred to in this quotation comes from Heidegger, in particular from Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art." This writing is significant for its direct address to Hegel's pronouncement on the death of art and architecture. Heidegger says that Hegel could be right. Can we find in modernity an "authentic" work of art? There is so much art-business, art industry, works of art are stockpiled like so much raw material.²³ There is something acute here, that goes straight to his essay on the essence of technology. The epoch of modernity is marked by instrumentalist technology. The authentic question of "what is?" is marked by the equipmentality of the thing. Whatever is, in its thingness, is equipmental, is instrumentally a means for production. While Heidegger notes the devastation of this "stamping" of our epoch, with the gods fleeing and the forgetting of the forgetting of Being, he recognises this as the essence of technology. A third of the essay he wrote on the origin of the artwork is devoted to thinking the equipmentality of equipment. In as

much as modernity's authentic mode of being is technological, Hegel is absolutely correct about the death of art and architecture. But Heidegger equivocates with another story, of "truth happening in the work" (rather than Hegel's slave winning freedom in producing) and "the strife between world and earth," the latter becoming the key motif for Harries' ethos of architecture.

But what did Harries miss here? The task of architecture remains the showing of the way. This is its "ethical function." The way to what? It would be authentic dwelling which means that we do not fear time, embracing a Heideggerian "being-for-death" as one's ownmost experience. What does architecture do here? It re-presents the essential "strife" between animality and ratio, between nature and spirit. In architecture, its decay, its materiality, there is the presence of the cosmic. For Harries this is a Heideggerian "cosmos" taken from Heidegger's dwelling on the Greek temple, which appears in "The Origin of the Work of Art."²⁴ Harries makes no mention of the long unfolding which happens in that essay, concerned as it is with the thing character of the thing, the equipmentality of equipment and the work character of the work. Given the task, and that architecture must "function," it is curious that Harries at the very least does not qualify in what way he is not simply forgetting the forgetting of Being here and putting architecture to work, wherein architecture may be thought of as so much "standing reserve" of ethical directedness. That is to say, architecture is equipment, and technology resides as the framing of our authentic dwelling. It is that which disposes us to see how to live. I suggested earlier how "function" is deployed as a "mediating," where mediation is between, for example the Adamic body and paradise. Harries stresses it is Adam fallen and here the mediation is the "strife between earth and world," a bridge between the human and the ideal. We see in the concluding moments to Harries' book:

As Speer proved, works of architecture, too, can claim the authority of the golden calf. What is needed today is something else: an architecture that without surrendering its ethical function knows that it lacks authority and cannot and should not provide more than precarious conjectures about an ideal building.²⁵

How has Harries not committed to repetition, for all the invocation of the Temple at Paestum, an instrumentalist grounding of architecture? In many respects Harries does not distinguish sharply enough between the idealism and totalising of Hegel's speculative circle, certainly ambiguously present in Heidegger's essay, and Heidegger's own hermeneutic circle, for which the finite temporalisation of human existence is not totalisable to any global history. Certainly, the "strife between earth and world" in Heidegger is not that between nature and spirit or paradise and fallen Adamic man.

Is there still time?

This instrumentalism is precisely what he has done, and for two reasons, which are inter-related. One has to do with the

fold of time and technology, the other concerns the humanist ground of Harries' philosophy. They are related the moment we ask the question of obligation. What obliges architecture to this task given prominence by Giedion and Harries? What obliges us to explore perspectives on technology and architecture? What obliges in general? What is obligation? To ask this another way, more familiar to Harries, what is the time of our ethos?

The key issue in this discussion is that of human agency and technology. Is technology that which is at the disposal of a human agency such that we deploy or employ its capacities? Platonism's insistence on being over becoming, on stasis over change, instantiates a "terror of time" and *techne*, as a productionist metaphysics, becomes the securing of the permanent, which, in the contraction of a history of metaphysics, is also a will to power and will to will. In the terms with which this paper commenced, "souped up" and "unplugged" appear to be two different capacities to affect and differing takes on an exercise of power or will to power. Both get deployed from the position of a humanist causal agency, which is to say, we choose this deployment, and indeed subtend implications for freedom, domination and control in this choice. In the end, in spite of Heidegger's opposition to Hegel's freedom in labour with "truth happens in the work," Harries would have it this way. The choice is ours. Technology is at our disposal. Architecture is at our disposal to show the way to Dwelling. Architecture is a means to an end. Indeed, Harries says as much regarding technology, that technology must be affirmed and put in its place.

But is this the case? How does this not repeat the mediating, functioning bridge excavated by Harries at the Temple of Paestum, that bridge between the human and the cosmos? Perez-Gomez, like Harries, invokes the cosmic as an antidote to instrumentalism, invokes the capitalised thinking of the Cosmos, an Order, again capitalised, that we have lost, this loss being endemic to instrumental reason's losing of the way of Dwelling. My contention is that the bridge, each time invoked, is the blind insertion of task, construed as our Task, again capitalised for Architecture. We know that Heidegger qualifies the bridge as simply instrumental — it gathers — like the Temple at Paestum gathers. But the bridge divides. It divides what is gathered from what doesn't get gathered. Obligation is here invoked from on high, to Dwelling, to the Task, to Architecture. Foucault would say it is a technology of power, a play of forces that constitute our capacity to see what is seeable and say what is sayable.²⁶

"Souped up" or "unplugged," what is the difference? Here the question of time and obligation become paramount, not obligation from on high, from the Call of Being, from the Categorical Imperative, from the Good, from Freedom and Reason, eternal calls for the Task, where time is the corrosive agent of the permanent. But rather, obligation from below, from the facticity of the other, too many obligations, always in the plural. This time is neither a succession of nows in an eternity nor that called upon by First Principles, by Truth, Spirit, Order, the Good. Rather, this time is a singularity

which marks an obligation to act, not from the beginning of something, not after we have first worked out an Ethics, but in the middle, already begun, in the milieu, caught up in, without the distance from on high for perspectives, without the time to stand back, without reflective judgement. Here technology is disastrous, a disaster, without the Destining of Being to authenticate the epoch of enframing and provide the navigating star for Dasein's saving power.²⁷ What if there is no Task for Architecture; no Way to Dwell? It is not that we are primordially homeless and that *polis* constitutes fundamentally an originary questioning. For those, too, we wait too long for the gods to appear. Rather, in a firmament with indifferent stars, technology is the name we give to that which shakes our recognition of the moment of obligation, the each time arrival of an "it obliges me to act." Obligation does not proceed from technology, nor am I the agent who controls it. With the expression "technology of power" we understand technology as that which diagrams relations of power, couples bodies and commodities, produces subjects and names.

We may speak of technological determinism as if we have the choice and are able to measure degrees of freedom by monitoring technology's impacts, all the while never moving out from technology's framing of technology, as if there were an outside, a side of a self not encased or an unmeasured time of a self's embodiment. We like to give the name architecture to those complex and diverse practices that construe encasements and, as Harries might say, re-present embodiments. To suggest that technology is the means at our disposal for such construal, or even that Architecture is the means at our disposal to re-present an authentic construal, is to misrecognise the disaster that is agency itself. Rather, and this goes to the heart of the matter of time, technology (in as much as we say it is there, it functions) abstractly diagrams force against force, is the mark or trace of the moment when obligation arrives. In this technology marks an exchange of forces such that a capacity to be affected is the becoming of a capacity to affect." And architecture here becomes neither the sign of Dwelling, nor the highest affirmation of Spirit, but from moment to moment an inauguration of small disasters, neither simply nor apologetically, events of living.

NOTES

- ¹ The "Conference Overview" solicits "Perspectives on Architectural Technology." The "framework" I am referring to here resonates with the notion of "enframing" thought of as the essence of technology in Martin Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology," particularly so in relation to perspective as both a mathematisation of nature, invoking the possibility of a "world picture" and the subtending of a Cartesian subject in the naturalisation of a world view for a knowing subject. See Heidegger, "Question Concerning Technology" and "Age of the World Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1977), pp. 3-35 and 115-134.
- ² Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1997).
- ³ See, for example, Siegfried Giedion, *Space, Time, Architecture*. (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1967). Work on the cinematic and architecture such as that of Bernard Tschumi's cinematics at La Villette certainly begin to pose some fundamental issues as does Virilio's work on the disappearance of space, which places a curious but undeveloped emphasis on a question of time. See Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction*. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994) and *Cinegranzfolie: le Parc de la Villette*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987). Also, Paul Virilio, *The Lost Dimension*. Trans. Daniel Moshenberg, (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991).
- ⁴ Harries, op.cit., p. 237. Hence Platonism's adherence to being over becoming or stasis and permanence over change.
- ⁵ For a detailed analysis of Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic and Augustinian concepts of time in relation to political exchange constituting the civic, or the time of civic order, see Eric Alliez, *Capital Time*. Trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). On Bergsonian time, see Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-linage*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). On Heidegger's concept of time see Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*. Trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
- ⁶ For background readings in Anglo-American ethical theory see Paul W Taylor, *The Moral Judgement: Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) and T. Henderich, ed., *Morality and Objectivity*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). On recent critiques of ethical foundationalism see John D. Caputo, *Against Ethics*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
- ⁷ See also on this conjuncture, *Architecture, Ethics and Technology*. Ed. Louise Pelletier and Alberto Perez-Gomez. (Montreal; Buffalo: Institut de recherche en histoire de l'architecture, Canadian Centre for Architecture, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).
- ⁸ Concerning technology : does this mean on technology? cf Heidegger's comment that the essence of technology is not technological: "Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art." See "The Question Concerning Technology," op. cit. p. 35.
- ⁹ Harries, op. cit., p. 2.
- ¹⁰ Harries quickly distils Pevsner's analysis of architecture from Pevsner's own celebrated comparison of a cathedral and bicycle shed. Hence a concern with form and aesthetic criteria. Harries had Venturi's little formula for the decorated shed, developed in *Learning from Las Vegas*, in wait all along and quite easily loaded Pevsner into this category. See Nikolaus Pevsner, *An Outline of European Architecture*. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1958), p. 23 and Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form*. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 87.
- ¹¹ "Pevsner's understanding of architecture is representative of what, in opposition to the *ethical approach*, I shall call the *aesthetic approach*. On this approach, the point of architecture, as opposed to mere building, is to have aesthetic appeal, however that is going to be understood." Harries, op. cit. p. 4.
- ¹² This lack of an empirical datum for Harries is significant for two reasons. Firstly, there will hence be no reference to technology in or of particular buildings, no pieces of equipment for residing will be mentioned. Rather, function, task, equipmentality operate at an altogether different level. And secondly, it is for this reason that Harries needs to place an emphasis on mediation, as a connection between the empirical and the idea, Adamic Man and Paradise, the human and the cosmic. The appearance of "function" itself plays this pivotal role.

- ¹³ Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture*, op. cit.
- ¹⁴ Sigfried Giedion, *Technology Takes Command*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).
- ¹⁵ Harries, op.cit., p. 4.
- ¹⁶ The separation of Pevsner and Giedion in Harries' classification of aesthetic/ethical is made somewhat more complex when we turn to the theorist David Watkin and his *Morality and Architecture*. In this work Pevsner and Giedion are both equally guilty of totalitarian *zeitgeist* thinking, as opposed to Watkin's "creative genius." I would say that Harries' division is simply too clumsy to handle the complexity of positions in a text such as Watkin's. See David Watkin, *Morality and Architecture*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
- ¹⁷ This is a major issue taken up by John Caputo in demarcating difference between ethics as that derived from above ie from philosophical and metaphysical first principles and obligation as that subtending from below, from the facticity of encountering the other. See John Caputo, *Against Ethics*. op. cit.
- ¹⁸ Harries, op. cit., p. 125.
- ¹⁹ Harries, op. cit., p. 139.
- ²⁰ G.W.F. Hegel *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts*. Trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
- ²¹ Thus, for Hegel the emergence of Absolute Spirit inaugurates the end of history. On Hegel's notion of the end of history see Alexander Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James Nichols, Jr., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992) and an extended discussion of these in Jacques Derrida on *Specters of Marx*. Trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).
- ²² Harries, op. cit. p. 361.
- ²³ On the notion of "standing reserve" as stockpiling for production, see Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" op. cit. p. 15.
- ²⁴ See Caputo's response to Heidegger and the temple: *Against Ethics*. op.cit. pp. 150-166.
- ²⁵ Harries, op. cit. p. 364.
- ²⁶ See, for example, Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power," in *Power/Knowledge*. Ed. Colin Gordon (London: Pantheon, 1980).
- ²⁷ Caputo, op. cit. See especially the first chapter with a note on "Disaster," pp. 5-6. Here I am leaning heavily on Caputo's disarming text. Regarding the guiding star, we may note how Harries invokes this cosmic order in the Origin of Architecture, where Vitruvius alludes to that human capacity to "gaze upon the splendour of the starry firmament." See Harries, op. cit. p. 138.
- ²⁸ This is how, for example, Deleuze reads Foucault, between Kant and Spinoza. See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*. Trans. and ed. Sean Hand (London: Athlone, 1988).