

Exploring Ethical Grounding For Architecture: Four Lenses

GREGORY S. PALERMO
Iowa State University

PROLOGUE

Ethics asks: What is good? What is *areté*, excellence/virtue? What is right? What is just.'

Central questions of the discipline of architecture, architectural education and architecture's multiple modes of practicing are: What are architecture's intents, purposes and impacts? Do the acts of designing and building our habitat intrinsically embrace the questions that ethics asks? Commonsense may answer yes due to architecture's fundamental role in addressing human needs. Given that architecture is thought, process and object, and that its purposes range from shelter and construction to engaging "beauty" and theoretical and utopian speculation, what would the grounding for those ethics be?

The four lenses of aesthetics, architecture's rhetoric and ideologies, its social purposes, and applied ethics in practice, briefly sketched here, provide a framework for considering the ethical nature of architecture. It is through the practical efforts at giving form, speculatively and physically, to the environment we inhabit that the field of ethics is engaged. Any one set of particular architectural activities can be viewed in terms of ethical reflection and action; can be defined and explored in classical ethical terms. It is at this point that architecture's ethical nature is revealed, and from which inquiry, understanding and construction of its ethical grounding can proceed.

NOTES ON ARCHITECTURE

Architecture is commonly defined as "1. The art or science of building or constructing edifices of any kind for human use. ... But *Architecture* is sometimes regarded solely as a fine art ...; 2. The action or process of building," (*Oxford English Dictionary [OED]*); "1. The art and science of designing and erecting buildings," (*American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd. ed.*). These dictionary definitions are clearly not the whole of it, but they have a compelling accuracy at their core. Architecture is about the particular places we shape in the landscape for our inhabitation; about their consideration, design, and fabrication. Habitat construction is an intentional act we undertake: art and craft and human intents are brought together regarding the places we inhabit.

Architecture has to do with human purposes and inhabitation — shaping, making, sheltering, dwelling. From simple dwellings to great edifices, to memorials and monuments, to infrastructural networks, we are engaged in modifying the inherited landscape, natural and man-made, for our present and projected needs and desires. The contemporary situation is that we are within the landscape of artifice from birth.

Our understanding of the world, the physical one and the one of human relations, is shaped by our habitat. Compare the agrarian

landscape of the Central Plains to that of Chicago. From northern Indiana to eastern Nebraska the horizon is below one's shoulders, the sky a full hemisphere above. One looks through the landscape across fields and between shelterbelts. The Jeffersonian grid is palpable and visible. Multi-generational farmsteads are still visible in this age of corporate farming. One can discern one's personal place and one's family's place within it. It is a built agrarian ethos. In comparison, the streets and avenues of the near north side of Chicago are bordered with 3 to 6 story buildings. Its crowded pavements and storefronts, the above grade transit rumbling overhead every 15 minutes, the sky not a dome but a slice, the space of alleyways in lieu of fields, the knowledge that within an arc of twenty miles live four million people in a continuation of this physical structure, all combine to give the experience of Chicago its own pulse. The Jeffersonian grid, interrupted by a few diagonals (the historic paths and railway lines that used to connect separate but now merged communities) on the plain, is palpable and present here too. One can discern one's place within it and one's family's place within it. It is a constructed urban industrial commercial marketplace ethos. Each is a complete world with a physical structure that arises from and in turn shapes the culture of which it is an exemplar. One obtains a good sense of the distinctiveness of place and its formation of ourselves that is examined by Norberg-Schulz in his reading and extension of Heidegger,² and the construction of ethos that Karsten Harries considers architecture's ethical function.'

Architecture addresses the forms and images of human habitat, the processes of its invention, its constructive technology and material fabrication. It includes the consideration of the history of the forms of places and their inhabitation; speculation and utopic propositions of what the forms and nature of being singly and collectively could be. Architecture has internal conventions of representation, judgment, composing. Our Western architectural psyche deals with Vitruvius' shadow in one way or another — honoring or critiquing "durability-utility-beauty," theory and practice, what to know about, how to prepare ourselves, etc. Architecture is the professing and practicing of knowledge and skill about such things.

This is the realm of architecture. It is portrayed in a language that is foreign to the deliberate reflection, dialectic argument and language of ethics.

ARCHITECTURE'S ASSERTIONS OF SOCIAL 'GOOD' AND ETHICS

Architecture *asserts* its role in being/providing "a good" for society through building: the art and craft, theory and practice, design and fabrication of the environment we inhabit. This assertion of the beneficial goodness of architecture has a long history in Western

architectural thought, stemming at least back to Vitruvius. Vitruvius, in his Preface to Book I, of the Ten Books On Architecture, addresses Caesar Augustus:

But when I saw that you were giving your attention not only to the welfare of society in general and to the establishment of public order, but also to the providing of public buildings intended for utilitarian purposes, so that not only should the State have been enriched with provinces by your means, but that the greatness of its power might be likewise be attended with distinguished authority in its public buildings, I thought that I ought to take the first opportunity to lay before you my writings on this theme?

Vitruvius undergirds Augustus' concern for the welfare of society and public with architecture, through which the goodness power and authority of the State is made manifest. He proposes an ethical architecture (at least in terms of the dominant ethos of his time).

Fifteen hundred years later, Alberti takes up the same theme: the well-being of society through architecture. In his Prologue to *On The Art of Building in Ten Books*, he says:

"Some have said that it was fire and water which were initially responsible for bringing men together into communities, but we, considering how useful, even indispensable, a roof and walls are for men, are convinced that it was they that drew and kept men together. We are indebted to the architect not only for providing that safe and welcome refuge from the heat of the sun and the frosts of winter (that of itself is no small benefit), but also for his many other innovations, useful both to individuals and the public, which time and time again have so happily satisfied daily needs."⁵ After listing various contributions, he begins his summation "To, conclude let it be said that the security, dignity, and honor of the republic depend greatly upon the architect: it is he who is responsible for our delight, entertainment, and health while at leisure, and our profit and advantage while at work, and in short, that we live in a dignified manner, free from any danger."⁶

Alberti links individual, communal and societal well-being to the architect's works.

The first reference in English to the "fine art" of architecture cited by the OED is from John Ruskin's *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*: "Architecture is the art which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man . . . that the sight of them contributes to his mental health, power and pleasure." This is a clear expression of architecture's 'good benefits' to humanity, to its flourishing, which perhaps could only be interpreted as ethical at its core.

This tradition of architects, from within the discipline of architecture, asserting the beneficial link to societal well-being, continues to the present. A recent manifestation comes from the Congress of the New Urbanism through its Charter which states "We recognize that physical solutions by themselves will not solve social and economic problems, but neither can economic vitality, community stability, and environmental health be sustained without a coherent and supportive framework."⁷ The Charter goes on to discuss the city, neighborhoods, blocks, streets and buildings — all within the province of architecture and related environmental design disciplines.

The ethical content of architecture is professed from within the discipline of architecture in other ways. The Vitruvian triad provides us with the first three design imperatives of what architecture *ought to* provide: durability, convenience and beauty. Palladio requires that the three need to be simultaneously present in architecture, both private and public: "That work cannot be called perfect, which should be useful and not durable, nor durable and not useful, or having both of these should be without beauty."⁸ These go beyond design imperatives to ethical imperatives. Architectural work that is lacking in these properties cannot contain virtue (*areté*) or goodness

(*agathos*), and thus is an unethical practice, not merely faulty design.

From various quarters there are other calls for an ethical architecture: The public architecture of a democracy ought to be accessible to the disabled. Architecture ought to be designed in a manner consistent with sustainable environmental practices. Context ought to inform architecture. We ought to save the revered architecture of our past, to reuse it, to reinvigorate it. Architecture has a revealing function with respect to the societal status quo, and *ought* to critique it. These oughts are presented as ethical duties.

NOTES ON ETHICS

Ethics is one of the principal divisions of philosophy. Following Socrates' lead in Plato's *Apology*, it is the inquiry into living a worthy life. It asks: What is good? What is right? What is fair or just? In what manner should I act in order to act with excellence or virtue? Each of these beneficial quests is paired with their logical obverse: *bad/evil*; wrong; *unjust*; and dissoluteness. Stemming from G. E. Moore's simple but bedeviling question of how we know what "good" is (since it is not an object, is couched in language, and is usually described by relating *examples* of "good" rather than the property "good"),¹⁰ much of 20th-C Anglo-American philosophical ethics has been engaged in attempting to understand the status (objective, subjective, natural, intuitive, emotive, etc.) of this value term and others, and how they might be the basis for action, or even if we could infer an "ought to" action from a value. These secondary questions of the questions of ethics are meta-ethics.

Ethics presumes a certain condition of those persons engaged in the consideration of ethical questions, and a certain status of humanity in general: that people are thoughtful in their considerations; that there is not only a concern of self, but also of one's relationship to others; that the means for mutual inhabitation lies in the will and capacity for persons to negotiate personal and public relations with others¹¹; that persons have autonomy and free wills, that they have a right to life, and to personal physical security, and that they have equal standing with others. Without these, there is no basis for discourse.

Ethical reflection and action also have a set of requirements. One is the discernment of the facts of an ethical dilemma: the who and what of the situation. A second is the identification of the ethical question(s) at hand; the values at stake, and possible outcomes of the dilemma given various choices. Another is reasoned consideration of competing claims, values and choices for acting with regard to the dilemma in terms of various ethical frameworks. Ethicists may differ on the approach to discerning the "facts" and the underlying basis for an approach to action, but these beginning points are implicitly assumed.

There are perhaps four broadly encompassing foundations of ethics to which other positions refer or within which they are enveloped: consequences from action (teleological ethics; Consequentialism); action stemming from principles (deontics); actions stemming from virtue (virtue ethics); and action based upon agreements (contractarianism).

Teleological ethics deals with ends and means, actions toward them — ends, or net positive consequences, being the moral objects of good, right, fairness, etc. Utilitarianism and its approach to identifying and calculating the maximized benefit in a given situation is the prime example of a teleological ethics. Utility theory is the underlying premise of cost/benefit standards, often applied in urban planning and public policy, which maximize good for the public benefit of the most persons. The *telos* toward "happiness" is traced to Aristotle, and that of net utility benefits to Bentham and Mill. For a corrupt mode, there is Machiavelli.¹²

Kantian ethics¹³ is a prime example of deontic ethics. However one arrives at guiding principles — through reason or intuition for example — they are universal and necessarily apply to all situations. The guiding principle that life is sacred leads to choices that do not

take lives, regardless of the possible negative consequences to some of the participants in the situation. The recent film *Saving Private Ryan* is an example of deontic ethics: eight men to save the last of four sons, for a mother who has lost three sons already; it is a moral duty to prevent more loss to the mother.

Virtue ethics is rooted in Greek ethics of *eudaimonia* — roughly translated as happiness (not of the giddy sort), which for the Greeks included personal virtue and excellence of mind and character. The virtue and excellence of *being* take into account classic virtues such as temperance, courage, and truthfulness, as well as performing one's role or obligations well in a community of persons. Thus, virtue theory extends to (or from) communal relations, and is not solely private. Virtue theory may be bracketed by Aristotle and MacIntyre.¹⁴

The final enduring tradition is rooted in individualism, libertarianism and agreement — the social contract among equals, who may in fact have conflicting ethical objects. The premium is the autonomy of the individual. The political collective, the state, or the moral collective establish sufficient agreement to permit action. Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls are exemplars.¹⁵ Rawls' 20th-C contribution is in bringing utilitarian and deontic conceptions of the societal good into a decision framework that mediates conflicting status positions and objects, thus shifting the focus from utility, power and judgment to justice and moral agreement.

There are many other "isms" in ethics. For example, relativism (which has a primary position in what is clearly a multi-cultural world of differences), — an ethics that accepts that differing cultures and groups have differing, equally valid values that are consistent in their time and place and valid for the community of persons centered around them, and which may in fact be in conflict with other systems; or egoism — the proposition that humans act to maximize their self-interest and happiness (in the pleasure sense); or a contemporary feminist alternative to the public political ethics tradition, the ethics of caring — where one's ethical actions are guided by a nurturing, emotive, caring model that stresses relationships over "rules," "principles" or "judgment." Ethical conflicts arising from these perspectives are usually resolved by appealing to the four principal theories presented above. In all cases there is an attempt to consider and do "good," or "right" or "fair" with respect to self and others in a given situation.

Ethics and ethics discourse takes place in this realm. This is a realm that seems very far from the context of architecture and its discourse.

DISCERNING ARCHITECTURE'S INTERSECTIONS WITH ETHICS: FOUR LENSES

Given the questions ethics asks and the ethical assertions from within the discourse of architecture, how are the two linked? Architecture is a subject of history and sociology, of economics and power, and of aesthetics. Without ethical content however, or only asserting its ethics self-referentially from within, architecture seems doomed to speak to itself, disconnected from any cultural rootedness. Without that grounding, architecture is capricious art on one hand or iconographic commodity on another — both of which are the manners by which it is perceived and treated by much of contemporary society at large and social critics.¹⁶

With discourses and traditions so dissimilar, one may wonder in what manner(s) the two disciplines intersect, and in what ways architecture not only asserts its ethics from within, but how it may be perceived and understood as an ethical practice. How do we get through the intuitive to a reasoned consideration of the issue? Recent efforts include the following: Design image and making as moral enterprise as seen through Pugin and Pevsner are taken up by David Watkin in *Morality and Architecture*. Karsten Harries critiques aesthetic legitimation for architecture's ethics in *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, linking architecture to a manifestation of

culture, a construction of ethos. Philip Bess presents an Aristotelian and communitarian view.¹⁷ This is where I would like to begin — proposing a means by which to more generally access the ethical issues in architecture, and by extension, to explore architecture's ethical grounding. Presented herein brief outline are four lenses with which to examine the ethical/architectural conflation.

The Lens of Aesthetics

The first lens is that of architecture's relationship to art, its being an art, and thence to the philosophy of art and aesthetics, the beautiful and the sublime, and human flourishing. This may be the most debated issue of ethics in architecture, because for many it is the self-aware "art"fulness of architecture that differentiates "architecture" from mere "building." In its role of giving form, beauty, image and meaning to societal expectations, aspirations or needs, we look to discern architecture's *embodiment* of moral force.

Since the Enlightenment, art has had autonomy as its order. That is, the artist's role is an autonomous one in society in that it may help define or critique culture, and may reveal the essence of conditions of life in a manner distinct from reason and empiricism, but it does not owe a duty (practical or utilitarian) to culture or to others beyond the artist's ethic. The Enlightenment perspective superseded earlier notions of art's relationship to nature, to the divine and society and its role of revealing the true nature of things, and its re-presenting the order of reality in ways that other modes — reason and science — could not. In this view, architecture, being enmeshed in human purposes for inhabitation and aspiration, is a lesser art than the pure fine arts, and cannot exist as art for art's sake. When it asserts itself as such, beyond its role as artistic production it has no compelling moral force — that is, it is no longer architecture which by definition has a conceptual purpose, but art object which has aesthetic "purposefulness without purpose" as its inherent object.¹⁸ Architecture is thus in suspension between Vitruvius who posits the aesthetic content of beauty as the differentiating characteristic of architecture above mere building, and the post-Enlightenment perspective that limits architecture's role as an art because of its links to utility and material craft.

These themes have been taken up in articles by L. Krukowski, who attempts to build a bridge between art, morality and aesthetics; David Bell who critiques the conception of the disinterested autonomous artist and connoisseurship as well as the ethical force of architectural forms *per se*, and posits an interactivist mode of construction and form giving; Watkin who attacks 19th and 20th-C theoreticians and historians who assert fixed truth and moral agency to architecture of various aesthetic styles and forms; and Harries, who argues against aesthetics as the foundation for architecture's ethical function.¹⁹

The Lens of Architecture's Rhetoric and Ideologies

The second lens of ethical consideration is that from within architecture's rhetoric and ideologies. We will use a few examples of design-driven ideologies to illustrate this perspective. The Modern Movement's intentions were profoundly ethical: that is, to make an architecture of the modern era, to utilize current technology, to discard the historical styles and academic architecture, and to address social projects such as worker's housing. When combined, these strategies were to sweep aside capitalist bourgeois class restrictions and to make a more egalitarian society, using architecture as a vehicle to give form and expression to these concepts. Whatever its naïveté, and even though after the Museum of Modern Art exhibition of 1931 the aesthetic of modernism was usurped as an object of connoisseurship and adopted by the modern corporation (exactly opposite its original intents), it began as an ethical proposition.²⁰

As early as Horatio Greenough in the 1840's, observers in America were calling for a "true American architecture," one that

would cast off Europe's formal iconic precedents and which would emerge from American climate, functional necessities (the settlement of America, its commerce and the construction of its institutions), and expression." These are later taken up through Sullivan and Wright, in contradistinction to the impact of the 1893 Chicago Exposition which looked to the European beaux arts. Another ideology with ethical force is that of sustainable design, designing in resource-conserving ways, and with materials and methods that slow the degradation of resources, so that future generations will have a world to inhabit.²² In the Greenough, Wright, Sullivan and environmental sustainability ideologies interlocking aspirational intention, social-political-economic-cultural threads, and formal strategies to support them are proposed as the premises for a "true architecture," an ethical architecture.

More conservative positions, relying upon the relationship of architecture to power, social elites, controlling mores, and thus architecture's power to construct order (while simultaneously excluding "others") is another aspect of the ethical in architecture linked to rhetoric and ideology.²³

In addition to ethics which arise from *design* ideologies, there are special ethics that may arise from *process* ideologies, e.g., the paradigm of professionalization. The contemporary professional paradigm, based upon learned knowledge exercised with judgment in unique cases and disciplinary and legal professional autonomy, entails a social exchange corollary that demands of the professional complete trustworthiness. It demands provision of the vital knowledge even to those who cannot pay; this is the professional ethic of the Hippocratic Oath and the public defender system.²⁴

Doubts with regard to architecture's claims for special ethics based upon its body of knowledge and expertise, service and trustworthiness, goes at least back to Aristotle: "There are some arts whose products are not judged solely, or best, by the artists themselves, namely the those arts whose products are recognized even by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder [architect] only; the user of the house will be a better judge than the builder." Architecture has pursued and legally implemented the *forms* of the professional ethos, but whether it is indeed a profession of trustworthy service, of duty to those in need, is highly debatable. It is perhaps this difficulty, and the fact that many laypersons (who are not architects) have the knowledge and skills to design and build, that undercuts architecture's claims to professionalism, and thus to a special ethics.

The Lens of Social Purpose

The third lens through which we examine architecture is that of social purpose for beneficial programs, and its social purpose as communal cultural construction. We are in the world we have inherited, we value it, we imbue it with meaning, it shapes our perspective, as we shape it for ourselves. Architects are participating agents in that shaping: the ones that propose form and images, bringing to bear their specialized knowledge and skills of history, technology, construction, and aesthetics.

However, rarely are architects very often participants in the critical stage when, individually or collectively, persons or communities decide to intervene and change their world, whether it is to build a church, a school, a new home, a new factory or laboratory. As we identify these projects, we *type* the world. Just as we could chart a spectrum of architectural challenges from memorials, which have a pure symbolic, memory constructing aspiration, to nuclear power plants and transplant surgical theaters, which are driven by technological imperatives and functional perfection for safety, we could chart a spectrum of architectural social contribution: from architecture as art, to institutions of communal aspiration (schools, day care centers, churches and temples), to service and care (hospices, housing for the poor, for the homeless, hospitals), to places of commerce and labor, to places of control such as prisons, and to machinery of war (defensive and offensive machinery conceived

quite differently depending one's "side"). We can characterize modes of designing and decision making from self-help and participatory models to autocratic ones.

Architecture is carried out in these various circumstances and/or within the critical consideration of such ordering programs. The key is, we are enmeshed in the making. Some hold that it is architecture's focus on autonomy of its forms and processes, in lieu of focusing on its social engagement of processes, human purposes and forms, that has diminished its ethical role and its value to society.²⁶ To select a client or to work on a particular type of project are fundamental ethical choices distinct from the ideological or aesthetic position one brings to the project.

The Lens of Practices

The fourth lens is that of ethics in the action of architectural practices, the applied ethics of architecture. Architecture is enmeshed in a world of the processes of reflection conception design and construction; of clients, contractors, and individual craftspeople; of those people who use and experience the environments being designed; of contracts, licenses, safety codes; of the larger general public who may be affected by resource allocation decisions and the final form of architectural solutions and who may be of diverse ethnic religious racial and international cultures; and of financiers, manufacturers and materials and furnishing suppliers.

Many seemingly everyday events in architectural practices are ethical in their import: business and marketing choices (deciding on what projects to undertake, with whom to work, the values of each etc.); design deliberations and critiques (function, aesthetics, concepts); budgets (durability of architecture, value for expenditure); client and contractor interactions (honoring contracts, fairness, trust and advising); contracts (equitable conditions, value for service, mutual respect and duties); public presentations (who has the right to know and be advised about projects); and staff development and recognition. While these issues appear under the guises of professional practice and debates over the classic Vitruvian design trilogy of firmness-commodity-delight, embedded within them are ethical questions. Duties to self, the client, the general public, and to the discipline itself can clearly be traced. They are ethical, and demand an ethics. It is in the particular questions, in particular circumstances, that architecture's ethics are shaped. When we pull the threads on one of these everyday concerns what unravels are the deepest questions and premises of the discipline.

A BEGINNING

Architecture is an intrinsically ethical endeavor. The four lenses proposed here are a means by which to access the ethical dimensions of architecture. Particular architectural situations viewed through the aesthetic, ideological, social or practical frameworks may be cross-examined in light of the four principal ethical theories reviewed here. Together the lenses and ethical frameworks can be used instrumentally to identify ethical dimensions throughout the architectural curriculum. Technology, history and theory, and the studio can be seen as they are — non-neutral, value-charged, places of architectural action. Non-neutral because virtually no architectural choice is free of social, environmental, political implications. Value-charged, because each choice advances a perspective through which to pursue architecture.

NOTES

¹ These are classic questions of Western ethics, and 20th-C Anglo-American ethical studies. Although significant critiques have been leveled against their formulation and the literature and reasoning that supports their debate, e.g., feminism and Continental philosophy, all ethical questions including those of the critiques are concerned with what manner to live and act ethi-

- cally. From that shared objective, these questions continue to have validity.
- Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence, Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971); and *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), in particular his note of debt to Heidegger, p. 5.
- ³ Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT, 1997), p. 3.
- ⁴ Vitruvius. *The Ten Books of Architecture*, (1st-C, BCE), trans. Morris Hicky Morgan, (New York: Dover, 1960). p. 3.
- ⁵ Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, (1452), trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, Robert Tavernor, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 3.
- ⁶ *Ibid*, p. 5.
- ⁷ *Charter of the New Urbanism* (San Francisco: Congress for the New Urbanism. undated).
- ⁸ Andrea Palladio, *The Four Books of Architecture*, (1570), trans. Isaac Ware, 1738, (New York: Dover, 1965), I.1 ¶1. In the meaning of virtue and excellence stemming from practices used by Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue*, 2nd, ed., (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), Chap. 14 "The Nature of Virtues" 187, passim. *Areté* embodies the concept of excellence of being. *Agathos* defines goodness in terms of how well a person, practice or thing fulfills the objects of its expected content and roles: a military general must be "general like;" a building must possess the best attributes of "building."
- ¹⁰ George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica* (1903) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 3-15.
- ¹¹ For an example see Jurgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, tran. Christian Lehhardt and Shierry Weber Nocholsen, intro. Thomas McCarthy, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 65-66. proposing an alternative to Kantian universals and Rawls' "original position," with respect to valid universalizable norms and processes of ethical discourse: "All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its [the norm's] general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation)... and ..." "Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse."
- ¹² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 4th-C BCE; Jeremy Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1789; John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, 1861; Nicolo Machiavelli. *The Prince*, 1517.
- ¹³ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785.
- ¹⁴ Aristotle, op. cit., Note 12; Alasdair MacIntyre, op.cit., Note 9.
- ¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1651; Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, 1762; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971.
- ¹⁶ For example, see the Diane Ghirardo and Peter Eisenman exchange in *Progressive Architecture* (Nov. 1994): 70-73, (Feb. 1995): 88-91, (May 1995): 11 and following; or Jean Baudrillard commenting on the Beaubourg, 210-217, and Baudrillard's, 220-221, and Fredric Jameson's critiques of the Los Angeles Bonaventure Hotel, 242-246, in Neil Leach, ed., *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
- ¹⁷ David Watkin, *Morality and Architecture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Karsten Harries, op.cit., Note 3; Philip Bess, "Ethics in Architecture," *Inland Architect*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (May/June 1993): 74-83; and "The Architectural Community and the Polis: Thinking About Ends, Means, and Premises," in *Architecture, The City and Community: Proceedings of the East Central Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture Conference*, held at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, (November 7-8, 1997). pp. 2-8.
- ¹⁸ For discussions of the hierarchy of the arts and of the limitations of the role of architecture as a pure fine art see: Dalibor Veselý, "Architecture and the Question of Technology," in Louise Pelletier and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, ed., *Architecture, Ethics, and Technology* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994), p. 37, a discussion of the *ars mechanicae*, *ars liberales*, the *scientiae*; which ascend from those associated with craft and making (architecture and engineering) to those of theoretical speculation (metaphysics); Gary Shapiro, "Hegel, G. W. F.," in David E. Cooper, ed., *A Companion to Aesthetics*, Joseph Margolis & Crispin S. Artwell, advising ed., Blackwell Companion to Philosophy Series (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1992, pbk., 1995). "It should come as no surprise that he [Hegel] thinks of the individual arts as forming a hierarchy, rising from those most tied to constraints of the material world (for instance, architecture) to those that are first, or most ideal, in this respect (for instance. poetry)," 186; Immanuel Kant, excerpts from *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard with revisions by Lewis White Beck, in *Kant: Selections*, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Scribner/Macmillan Book, 1988). Sections 10-17 discuss concepts of purpose in art (which is to possess "purposiveness [as art only] without purpose [intentionality, utility]," ideal beauty and examples. Section 16: "But human beauty...the beauty of a church or a house, presupposes a purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently the concept of its perfection. It is therefore adherent beauty. Now as the combination of the pleasant (in sensation) with beauty, which properly is concerned only with form, is a hindrance to the purity of the judgment of taste, so also is its purity [as an art work] injured by the combination with beauty of the good (viz., that manifold which is good for the thing itself in accordance with its purpose)," 369. The root of architecture's limitations as a pure fine art, *l'art pour l'art*, is its purposefulness, which is the source of its ethical content.
- ¹⁹ David Bell, "In medias res," 19-37, and Lucian Krukowski, "Art and Ethics in Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer." 6-17. both in *Via 10*. Krukowski references this hierarchy from material bound art to the higher arts of language as presented by Schopenhauer in his article; Watkin, op.cit., Note 17; Harries dismisses the *l'art pour l'art* position in "The Ethical Function of Architecture," in *Descriptions*, ed. Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), "From the aesthetic approach, architecture can claim the dignity of the other arts only to the extent that it liberates itself from building and becomes absolute. But for such an architecture we have no use," 132, and Harries, op.cit., Note 3, Ch. 2-5.
- ²⁰ Robert Twombly addresses this in *Power and Style: A Critique of Twentieth-Century Architecture in the United States* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), pp. 52-88. The MOMA exhibition publication coined the phrase "International Style" and applied it to the modern architecture that had emerged in Europe 1918-1930.
- ²¹ Horatio Greenough, *Form and Function: Remarks on Art, Design and Architecture*, ed. Harold A. Small, introduction by Erle Loran. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947 & 1966).
- ²² William McDonough, "Design, Ecology, Ethics and the Making of Things," and "The Hanover Principles," in Kate Nesbitt, ed., *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965-95* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, c. 1996), pp. 397-410.
- ²³ Joining Ulrich Conrads, ed., classic *Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture*, are three new readers of short texts that provide fertile ground for initial exploration of architecture's moral intents through its ideologies and rhetoric: Joan Ockman, ed., *Architecture Culture 1943-1968: A Documentary Anthology*; Kate Nesbitt, ed., *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory 1965-1995*; and Jay Stein & Kent Spreckelmeyer, ed., *Classic Readings in Architecture*.

- ²⁴ For various interpretations of the special ethical obligations/claims of professions see: Michael D. Bayles, *Professional Ethics*, 2nd. ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1989); Bruce A. Kimball, *The "True Professional Ideal" in America: A History* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); Daryl Koehn, *The Ground of Professional Ethics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); John Kultgren, *Ethics and Professionalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988); Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California press, 1977).
- ²⁵ Footnote 8, page 188, Aristotle, *Politics*, 1282a18-23, Loeb ed., in Daryl Koehn, *op. cit.*, referenced in Koehn's discussion of client's knowledge, and relationships with professionals regard-

ing judgment based upon expertise, 37. (The remark is made by Aristotle during a discussion of collective communal judgment and legislation relative to topics where expert knowledge may be claimed to be necessary. He confines deferral to expertise to very limited circumstances.)

- ²⁶ For recent additions to this tradition see Thomas Dutton and Lian Hurst Mann, ed., *Reconstructing Architecture: Critical Discourses and Social Practices* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); and Diane Ghirardo, ed., *Out of Site: A Social Criticism of Architecture* (Seattle: Bay Press, 1991). For an introduction to Continental socio-philosophical critique, see Neil Leach, ed., *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).