

# Unconscious Models of the Mind: How the European Architectural Avant-Garde of the 1960s Liberated Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts

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## THEORY AND CRITICISM

Since the early 1960s there have been a number of attempts by architects and urban theorists to situate architecture and the city as a metaphorical site of psychological conflict and resolution. Following in Georg Simmel's footsteps from the early twentieth century, the city and building had become the contested ground of emotional and psychological inscription. Architects such as Aldo Rossi, Bernard Tschumi, and Rem Koolhaas, as well as architectural groups such as Archigram and Archizoom all participated in theoretical projects, writings, and manifestoes that engaged the language and ideas culled from the radical reassessment of the sciences psychology and psychiatry. These avant-garde practitioners of architecture and urbanism radically reassessed the practical boundaries of the late modern era with models, theory, and language that took many of its cues from the "psychoanalytic culture" that predominated in Europe at this time. As this essay is part of a larger project, the scope will be narrowed to investigate the examples of Archigram and Archizoom. It should be understood at the outset that these two examples are merely illustrative of a greater and more intricate web of associations and lines of thought.

Although Rossi engaged psychoanalysis on a purely formal level, relying heavily upon Freud's construction of the city as a topological mapping/metaphor of the unconscious, the generation that followed him began to assimilate the radical re-writings of Freud and the pushed toward a more liberative Freudianism found in the writings of Herbert Marcuse and those of the anti-psychiatry movement. This movement from a more formal model to a more radical one is not surprising given the political, aesthetic, and philosophic explosions that find their power in the freedom of the 1960s.

From the 1950s to the early 70s the hegemonic practices and theories of psychology and psychiatry are critically reassessed by numerous practitioners and theorists looking to reevaluate the way in which the modern discipline operated and constructed ideologies. Questions about the role of desire, the function of language and its relationship to the unconscious, and new models of psychic function and production were all tirelessly reassessed and debated in interdisciplinary periodicals, at public conferences, and through numerous books and journals.

Prior to the industrial revolution, the city had been seen as an analog for the human body. In many Enlightenment documents, we find descriptions of the well-being of the city being dependent upon its structuring as a human body: the parks being the "lungs" of the city, streets being the "arteries" etc. With the onset of the industrial revolution, and the impact of the noise and visual stimuli that pervaded the modern city, the descriptions of the metropolis turned from metaphors of the body to those of the mind. Wherein, philosophers and writers had been concerned with the impact of the

city on the body of the dweller (the city as creating disease, pestilence, etc.) now the city was described as impacting the emotional and psychological well being of its denizens. This transformation can be seen as both a response to the interest in the psyche brought on by the burgeoning development of psychoanalysis, and also as a reflection of modernity's interest in the individual as the subject of analysis.

This particular line of thought begins with Georg Simmel's seminal essay from 1903 "The Metropolis and Mental Life." In this essay Simmel introduces his concepts of *objective* and *subjective* culture and meditates upon the way in which the metropolis has constructed "the metropolitan type": an individual whose psyche is made up of the extreme differences presented by the metropolis, and whose actions are made up predominantly as reactions in a rational, rather than emotional, manner. For Simmel, this predicated the birth of the "blasé attitude." For this author the city is an apparatus that promotes a certain psychological manifestation or structuring. Another analog of the city and the psyche is introduced in Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*. This conceptual basis is used to introduce a discussion of Aldo Rossi's 1966 *The Architecture of the City*; Rossi sees the city as a site of memory and his work as that of an architectural psychoanalyst — uncovering the layers of conscious memory toward a discovery of the buried past.

With the development of the Industrialized city came a plethora of complaints and problems associated with the new urban fabric. The Industrialized/Mechanized city was seen as deleterious to one's health — both mental and physical. A response to this sentiment can be seen in the early writings of the German socialist Georg Simmel. His 1903 essay entitled "The Metropolis and Mental Life" is an early examination of the psychological effects of modern life upon man. Simmel was concerned with the form and content of individuality. He approached the study of this question by producing "a number of questions and observations; the different forms in which individuality may be attained; the social conditions which favor the attainment of individuality."

For our purposes a brief look into Simmel's questions and investigations into the relation between the individual and objective culture will help to illuminate the connection between urbanism/architecture and (what Simmel calls) "mental life." For Simmel, "culture" refers to "the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course of history. Objective culture refers to only one side of this process — to the complex of ideal and actualized products. The other side, the extent to which individuals assimilate and make use of these products for their personal growth, is the domain of subjective culture."

Hence, we have the distinction between objective and subjective culture and if we are to apply these terms to urban life (as does Simmel), we find the distinction as such: there is *objective culture* of

the urban environment: cities, buildings, traffic, industry, etc. etc. and *subjective culture* (which is an effect of objective culture) can be described as the way the products or objects of objective culture affect the individual.

In Simmel's response to the city and mental life we see traces of an Enlightenment attitude toward the affects of the city on the body. Earlier, philosophes, writers, and architects were concerned with the way the circulation of air and human traffic through the city might affect the physical well being of its inhabitants. Questions of proper wind direction in the placement of buildings were believed to be essential in the planning of new urban centers. Simmel's essay builds upon these earlier concerns and transposes the question of the body into the question of the mind.

To the extent that the metropolis creates these psychological conditions—with every crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational and social life—it creates in the sensory foundations of mental life, and in the degree of awareness necessitated by our organization as creatures dependent on differences, a deep contrast with the slower, more habitual, more smoothly flowing rhythm of the sensory-mental phase of small town rural existence.'

This work helps to set up the question of how the city began to be seen as an analog or metaphor for the mind and how one might begin to ask questions about the positioning of the city in psychological terms and theory.

In 1930 Sigmund Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents* asks the reader to understand the unconscious processes as a city: Rome to be exact. At first, it may seem strange that a psychoanalyst would use the metaphor of the city to explicate mental life, but upon further investigation the analogy seems quite appropriate. By 1930 the style and ideology of High Modernism had taken hold. The widely believed idea that the desuetude of the nineteenth century industrialized city could be redeemed by a Utopian vision of architecture and urban life was one that still held promise. For Freud and his followers, the idea that the psychoanalytic process could rescue the conflicted and repressed individual was a direct product of the same positivism that had led architects and planners such as Le Corbusier, Camillo Sitte, Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus to believe that civilization in general could be saved by functional design. Within this atmosphere of the promise of a redemptive Utopia achieved through proper design and planning, it is not surprising that Freud looked to the city as a site for psychoanalytic analogy. It was a metaphor that was easily understandable to his class of readers.

Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace—that is, its annihilation—we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when for instance, regression goes back far enough) it can once more be brought to light. Let us try to grasp what this assumption involves by taking an analogy from another field. We will choose as an example the history of the Eternal City. Historians tell us that the oldest Rome was the Roma Quadrata, a fenced settlement on the Palatine. Then followed the phase of the Septimontium, a federation of the settlements on the different hills; after that came the city bounded by the Servian wall; and later still, after all the transformations during the periods of the republic and the early Caesars, the city which the Emperor Aurelian surrounded with his walls.'

Here, Freud sets up the analogy for the reader. He reminds us that we are to remember that "forgetting" does not mean the destruction of a memory-trace, but that once something is formed in mental life it cannot perish; the memory remains preserved, although it may not be visible on the surface. From this idea Freud moves into the

concept of the ancient city of Rome being like the psyche of an individual: although we cannot immediately differentiate the layers of historical detritus, the discerning eye of the historian has certain tools to uncover what has been hidden.

Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough—more than present day archaeology does—he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall and the outline of the *Roma Quadrata*... Of the buildings which once occupied this ancient area he will find nothing, or only scanty remains, for they exist no longer. The best information about Rome in the republican era would only enable him at the most to point out the sites where the temples and public buildings of that period stood. Their place is now taken by ruins, but not by ruins of themselves but of later restorations made after the fires or destruction. It is hardly necessary to remark that all these remains of ancient Rome are found dovetailed into the jumble of a great metropolis which has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance. There is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings. This is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical sites like Rome.'

Freud then asks the reader to take "a flight of imagination" and suppose that Rome is "not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one."<sup>6</sup> Here Freud sets up the spatialization of the city for the reader. The reader no longer would imagine Rome as we see it today, a piece of a villa here and the Coliseum there, but each of the buildings in their original form and place even if they begin to layer one on top of another.

This would mean that in Rome the palaces of the Caesars and the Septizonium of Septimius Severus would still be rising to their old height on the Palatine and that the castle of S. Angelo would still be carrying on its battlements the beautiful statues which graced it until the siege by the Goths, and so on. But more than this. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Cafarelli would once more stand without the Palazzo having to be removed—the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this not only in its latest shape, as the Romans of the Empire saw it, but also in its earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terra-cotta ante fixes... indeed, the same piece of ground would be supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built.'

At this point Freud dismisses the exercise that he had just put himself and the reader through and rejects his metaphor on the basis of its failed pictorial agenda. It seems as if he mistakenly reads his own analogy in a literal manner that fails to take into account the complexities of spatial and visual representation. It is those same complexities that he himself called upon to explain his own theory of the unconscious, in which he proposes that a memory can be covered over, or even replaced by a screen memory, and then brought back by a series of linguistic or even pictorial exercises.

True, two buildings cannot physically occupy the same space as complete objects in the same time, but there are a number of contingencies that would allow for that kind of occupation. One can imagine that the ruin of one building can serve as the base or foundation for a new one. The plan of an old building can be resurrected to serve as the plan for a new. Stones that have been preserved from an ancient building can be used to rebuild anew. An old building once used for one function is reprogrammed and then

used for a completely different function. The typology of a certain building can be emptied of its content, yet still retain its typological facade and be filled with an entirely new content. What can be discerned from just these few examples in a field of many is that Freud's analogy is useful and by his denial or refusal to take it further he discounted a model that was to become a major force in future architectural theory and practice.

If we can consider the Unconscious as a construct of consciousness, then we can extend the metaphor of architecture and its Unconscious a bit further. In architecture, the act of covering the ground creates a site. The idea that architecture in its most simple terms creates or produces a space (covers the site, differentiates that site, creates a topography) is analogous to the space that Psycho-Analysis constructs for the Unconscious and the Conscious. The city creates a site by continuously covering up, exposing, repressing, and then building. The outward manifestation of the city can be seen as the Conscious, it is the objective, projected manifestation of a process. Perhaps the Unconscious of the city can be seen as the dweller that it still remains hidden under layers of objective culture.

Aldo Rossi's investigations into theory and architecture are best known through his ground-breaking work of 1966 *L'Architettura della città* (Architecture of the City). In this work Rossi draws upon the work on typology of Carlos Argan (his mentor) and a 19th century approach to the urban situation and crisis, that of Maurice Halbwachs. Rossi calls upon ancient and classical models to guide him through his exploration of the city. His work incorporates deeply psychological models of the city as a site of consciousness and memory, yet he never acknowledges the debt to these paradigms. His text represents a (seemingly) conscious repression of the notion of psychology/psychoanalysis while manifesting the symptom through the writing of the essay.

The crisis of the city is rationally and clinically approached in "Architecture and the City." Here he first introduces his conception of the city. The city is to be understood as architecture, and what he means by architecture is "not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its different architectures, but architecture as construction, the construction of the city over time."<sup>8</sup> This can be seen as analogous to Freud's model of the Unconscious. From the outset, Rossi's language is infused with that of psychology/psychoanalysis: "With time, the city grows upon itself; it acquires a consciousness and memory." He introduces what is to be a major site of investigation that of "memory." Rossi wishes to correct, what he sees as a major problem in urban studies: that of the question of singular urban artifacts. He says that by ignoring them "precisely those aspects of reality that are most individual, particular, irregular, and also most interesting—we end up constructing theories as artificial as they are useless."<sup>9</sup> He uses that basis as a way to establish an "analytical method susceptible to quantitative evaluation and capable of collecting the material to be studied under unified criteria."<sup>10</sup>

His method of investigation will be a comparative one. He wants to emphasize historical methodology as well, but he maintains that the city cannot be only viewed from a historical standpoint. He charges that one must locate the "city's enduring elements or *permanences* so as to avoid seeing the history of the city solely as a function of them." He goes on to state that he believes these *permanences* to be considered as "pathological" at times. By pathological we are to assume he means unhealthy, diseased, (although the word can also denote disorder). Finally, in the last part of the book, he wants to "set forth the political problem of the city; here the political problem is understood as a problem of choice by which a city realizes itself through its own idea of the city."<sup>11</sup>

This idea of the city realizing itself through its own idea of the city has both ideological and psychological implications. We might understand this concept as the development of the city as subject—the formative of the function of the city as revealed in the experience of the city.<sup>12</sup> At this point it might be helpful to remind ourselves of

Lacan's ideas of the formation of the *I*.<sup>13</sup> Like a good psychoanalyst or anthropologist, Rossi confronts the problem he finds with contemporary urban studies dealing only with the city as a collective site of investigation and not addressing the individual or singular artifacts that construct that city. He wants to deal with what Simmel would call the objective *culture* that comprises the city. Immediately a paradox is sighted in his theoretical construction. He continuously calls for an investigation into these singular artifacts, or *permanences*, yet he repeatedly stresses the importance of "memory" which is used in a collective sense (as it is in the writing of Maurice Halbwachs). By describing the *permanences* (or singular artifacts) as potentially pathological, Rossi calls attention to the unhealthy nature that they might take on in the conscious construct of the city. If we are to read these *permanences* as manifestations of the unconscious in the urban fabric we must consider Rossi's work in terms other than merely architectural.

While Rossi still had faith in the palliative effects of rationalism and the rationalist model, the next generation of young European architects, were less accepting of modernism's ideology. Groups such as Archigram, Superstudio, and Archizoom, and architects such as Bernard Tschumi and Rem Koolhaas embraced the ideology of liberation, freedom, and pleasure which permeated Europe and the United States. Not simply leftists, whose target was "class based economic oppression," these new young radicals "...focused on how 'late capitalist society creates mechanisms of psychological and cultural domination over everyone.'"<sup>14</sup>

Themes of liberation and freedom were common place by the mid-60s. Although it is not the scope of this investigation to fully explain the development of this reactive ideology, one can look to the work of Frankfurt School sociologist Herbert Marcuse, and the psychological theories of radical psychologists such as R.D. Laing and Wilhelm Reich, as having a major impact upon cultural assumptions about the roles of repression and freedom within the development of society. Looking back to Freud's basic assumptions (whether we see it as a critical practice or not) one finds the seeds of concepts that will help Freud-Marxian analysts formulate their theories on liberative analytic practice. One basic assumption that they find in Freud and hold to be true is that we cannot escape social repression, and that all social configurations depend upon the repression of individual desires." This is the main concept of Freud's *Civilization* and its Discontents. For Freud the ability for society to survive depends upon individual repression—individual desires must be contained. Marcuse and Reich agree that society has repressed individual desire, but for them the answer to this repression and the ability for society to continue lies not in the continued repression of individual desires, but in the idea of the free-play of desire, and the release of sexual repressions.

Marcuse is concerned with the life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos). Life begins and the death instinct becomes subjected to the life instinct: "destructive energy is diverted either towards the outside world in the form of 'socially useful aggression', i.e. against nature. According to Marcuse, "Eros seeks pleasure."<sup>16</sup> According to Freud as civilization moves forward it becomes more and more pressure to maintain cultural order and development. Marcuse basically agrees, but adds the ideas of surplus repression and the performance principle. Capitalism, according to Marcuse, has repressed 'free sexuality' for its own needs, allowing sexuality to be cathected through controlled and acceptable release. With the development of the forces production such as mechanization and automation, the "historical necessity for existent forms of repression is undermined.... Automation promises the end of the use of the body as a mere instrument of production. The technical need for sexual repression can be challenged."<sup>17</sup> Instead of harboring and repression our desire and pleasure, technology has the capacity to free and motivate desire.

Modernism's failed functionalism and missed opportunity in terms of technologies liberative social powers is explored and

investigated in the work of the radical avant garde of the 1960s and early 70s. Groups such as the English Archigram and the Italian Archizoom and Superstudio begin to exploit technology in architecture with the hope of counteracting the societal and bodily repressions of late-capitalism. For groups such as these the ideology of technology in the modern had not been fully explored and had resulted in fairly disastrous effects. Archigram, in projects such as Walking City, Plug-In City, and Sin Centre illustrate their desire to produce works of architecture that *respond* to situations, instead of definite, defined, immovable structures that resist permutation. Their basic tenet was that 'the future of architecture lies in the brain.' For them, in a Marcusean vein, architecture should use advanced technology and through its use it will become programmatically more flexible — it will react to the changing needs and desires of its users. "In a technological society more people will play an active part in determining their own individual environment, in self determining a way of life."<sup>18</sup> They called their works "megastructures" and saw them as "social and psychological nets which allowed one to live in wider dimension while secured by relatively defined roles, rules, and signs." The works were often "nomadic" and they "represented adventures inexperiencing and testing social and psychological roles, rules, and behaviour." Their architecture could be "fun," and its function was to "make dreams come true, to help one find a niche in regulated, clearly defined fields (a release function, both private and public)."<sup>19</sup> Here, and elsewhere in their writings, their language is infused with ideas that equate a new architectural form with psychological and behavioural freedom. Their technological promiscuous architecture and city forms will enable the inhabitant to expand and break through boundaries of psychic and bodily repression and will lead them towards a liberating new production of life.

The ultimate aim for Archigram was the emancipatory function of architecture — building upon the Marcusean/Marxian dictum that technology would set us free.

The history of the last 100 years has been one of continued emancipation irrevocably moving forward despite the immense obvious setbacks of war and poverty, and the more hidden ones sustained by facets of culture and tradition that seek to preserve as much as possible in the face of social change... If architecture laid claims to human sustenance, it should surely have responded as human experience expanded. For architects the question is: do buildings help toward emancipation of the people within? Or do they hinder because they solidify the way of life preferred by the architect? It is now reasonable to treat buildings as consumer products, and the real justification of consumer products is that they are the direct expression of a freedom to choose...<sup>20</sup>

The "Suburbs" of Ron Herron and Archigram's Instant City explode with color, noise and the promise of immanent liberation and free-play. Bodacious young women saunter across the landscape, and media driven images float in Zeppelin-televisions above our heads. Here children and adults jump for joy or languidly lounge on inflatable couches. An almost bacchic feast of delight and freedom awaits the intrigued visitor. Here images of pleasure abound and infrastructures that allow one to "play and know yourself" are effortlessly installed. In an almost Freudian exercise of free association, Warren Chalk extols the virtues of this new society enabled by technological freedom. The new model for the individual is a "technological opportunist — an inventor." The inventor will be "a breaker of boundaries." The new man or woman will look not to connections that hold things together like glue, but to a "less physical solution." New associations (soft solutions) allow us to get closer to the ultimate pleasure of being through their non-binding means of arrangement. This new form of being will be 'the absolute Truth of the happiness acid' enabled by the infrastructure of architecture and technology.

A few years after the birth of Archigram, the Italian/Florentinian

group Archizoom began to investigate the Marxian problematic of the individual and society. In writings that seem to be directly responding to Marcuse, Archizoom postulates that the inevitable solutions of modernism's methodology have left us in a culturally barren and neutral landscape. "The end-purpose of modern architecture is the 'elimination' of architecture itself."

As a rational structure' tending to resolve the greatest number of functional problems at an optimum technological level, modern architecture tends to work out definitive solutions and typologies, to regard, that is, the solution of problems as a progression towards the elimination of all unsolved problems through their gradual solution."

Modern architecture, like a good Freudian analyst, set out to simply normalize functioning and find resolution to any unresolved problems. But, according to Archizoom, the problematic is always greater than the ideology and even as architecture tries to rationalize itself out of existence, there is a diametrically opposing sense of architecture that offers it as a strictly private matter — "a direct extension of the body and of its expressive possibilities, as creative space related to one's psycho-physical individuality, and no more as planned space but as an infinitely variable communicative experience."<sup>22</sup> It is in this dialectic of the rational and the intensely personal economics of experience that Archizoom sets up shop and begins to practice. They see a conflict between the individual and architecture (as Freud and Marcuse see a conflict between the individual and society.) This conflict cannot be resolved at this point through dialogue because, as Marcuse has shown us, society wishes to repress and inherently anti-establishment sentiments and actions.

... it is in terms of a clash that this relationship is couched today, since all acts of self-liberation that the individual carries out are destined to put him beyond the moral, aesthetic, and cultural inhibitions of the current Establishment. The movement for the liberation of man from these 'behavioral code' helps him to regain culture as creative energy and as the spontaneous definition of his own identity.<sup>23</sup>

For Archizoom "the fundamental problem of architecture and of culture, then, is of "freedom." It is that same freedom that Marcuse points to that Archizoom wishes to engage. The freedom of the individual will advance through ludic practices. Ludic, or playful, practices can be more easily engaged within an architectural infrastructure of extreme rationality. So, like Archigram, they look to push technology to its most extreme limits, and they often find the expression of this most extreme form of rationalization in the scale of the city or the vast horizon of the American desert. It is only through these photo-montage contexts that we can begin to get the point. In the wind-blown desert of Monument Valley, Utah, monumental and mute odes to technology rise higher than the immense sky-scraper-like rock formations. These silent witnesses to technology's extremist form act like the silent Freudian analyst, bouncing associations off its shiny-smooth surfaces. Here, and in the city fabric of Milan and New York, these giant rationalists create expressive-free zones that will enable the inhabitants to explore new potentials of creativity through free-play. Without the worries of expression, Archizoom's monuments begin to repress the structures and forms of capitalism itself, taking modernism to its ultimate conclusion. By rupturing the fabric of the city or creating a sky-scraper in the desert that will reflect and mirror the endless horizon, these new forms will breakdown the bourgeois ideology of the house and the "subtle intellectual links and hysterical linguistic knots which characterize architecture as the figuration of space."<sup>24</sup> Here, architecture will be "[F]reed from the armor of its own character" and architecture will "become an open structure, accessible to intellectual mass production as the only force symbolizing the collective landscape."

Ultimately, in both the examples of Archigram and Archizoom,

as well as in the work of Superstudio, Bernard Tschumi, and Rem Koolhaas. architecture will enable the Marcusean individual to break through the repressive binds of bourgeois ideology and to begin to engage in a life that is imaginatively, intellectually, and creatively productive through the liberative practice of free-play. It is through the lens of the radical psychology of liberation and the Freud's foundation of a repressive civilization that inhibits the individual desire, that we can begin to see the intellectual underpinnings of these architectural projects.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Donald N. Levine, Intro. to *Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. xviii-xix.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*  
Simmel, p. 324.
- <sup>3</sup> Sigmund Freud. *Civilization and its Discontents: The Standard Edition*. trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1961.), pp. 16-17.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>7</sup> Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), p. 21.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- <sup>11</sup> Here, of course, I am referring to Jacques Lacan's *Mirror Stage as the Fortnative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience* (1936).
- <sup>12</sup> The child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own image in a mirror. This recognition is indicated in the illimitative mimicry of the Aha Erlebnis, which [Wolfgang] Kohler see as the expression of situational apperception, an essential stage of the act of intelligence. This act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of the monkey, once the image has been mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates — the child's own body, and the persons and things, around him. We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image — whose predestination to this phase effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term *imago*. Correlatively, the formation of the I is symbolized in dreams by a fortress, or a stadium — its inner arena and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish tips, dividing it into two opposed fields of contest where the subject flounders in quest of the

lofty, remote inner castle whose form (sometimes juxtaposed in the same scenario) symbolizes the id in a quite startling way. Similarly, on the mental plane, we find realized the structures of fortified works, the metaphor of which arises spontaneously, as if issuing from the symptoms themselves, to designate the mechanisms of obsessional neurosis-inversion, isolation, reduplication, cancellation and displacement. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.)

- <sup>14</sup> Alice Echols, "Women's Liberation, and Sixties Radicalism," in *The Sixties: From Memory to History*. ed. David Farber (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994), p. 155.
- <sup>15</sup> Stephen Frosh, *The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 59.
- <sup>16</sup> "Instincts refer to primary drives which have somatic and mental dimensions; their objectives and manifestations are subject to historical change, although their basic 'location' and 'direction' remain the same. in David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 121.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 122-125.
- <sup>18</sup> Warren Chalk "Housing as a Consumer Product." in *A Guide to Archigram: 1961-74* (London: Academy Editions, 1994), p.92.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.
- <sup>21</sup> Archizoom "Radical Architecture" in *Andrea Branzi: The Complete Works* (New York: Rizzoli, 1992), p. 38.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>24</sup> "The Fluid Metropolis" in *Andrea Branzi: The Complete Works*, p. 51.

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