

Foucault and Lacan: The Gaze and its Operation within Historiography

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The epistemology of sight is one of the most important sources of knowledge. Plato praised sight as the most exalted of the senses. Through sight knowledge and wisdom might be attained.¹ Indeed the philosophical term for theory comes from the Greek word for spectators, *theatai*.² Some philosophers argue that the culture of modernity, and the philosophical discourse that has taken place within it, are dominated by vision and a paradigm of knowledge, truth, and reality that is vision centered.³ Hannah Arendt states that

*from the very outset, in formal philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing...The predominance of sight is so deeply embedded in Greek speech, and therefore in our conceptual language, that we seldom find any consideration bestowed on it, as though it belonged among things too obvious to be noticed.*⁴

In her book "Body Criticism," Barbara Maria Stafford argues visual imagery constitutes a new form of global communication. Whether this is viewed as a welcome occurrence or not, the image has become a formidable instrument of power. Modern visualization technology is predicated on the fact that half of our neurological machinery is devoted to vision.⁵

Paradoxically, Stafford points out that the visual arts are damned to the bottom of the Cave of the humanities in that in "today's text-based curricula, sensory and affective phenomena continue to be treated as second-rate simulations of second-class reflections."⁶ Images are viewed as misleading illusion without the guidance of discourse. The tension between vision's ability to enlighten, yet at the same time deceive, goes back to Plato. Although Plato praised sight as giving the clearest knowledge of the natural world he also believed that appearances were suspect. Sight above the other senses was most often deceiving, since what it showed was always fleeting and incomplete.⁷

The work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan offer a critique to the ocularcentrism that is central to our culture. For Foucault the modern gaze has joined forces with technology and technocracy. "The gaze that sees is the gaze that dominates and masters."⁸ For Lacan, the gaze is an important element in the constitution of the self and like Foucault's gaze, is subject to domination and exploita-

tion. Foucault's panoptic gaze exemplified by Bentham's idealized prison and Lacan's gaze articulated in the "Mirror Stage" of human psychological development have significant implications for architectural historiography. Foucault's chapter on "Panopticism" in *Discipline & Punish* exposes the matrix of knowledge and power sustained by the panoptic gaze that inscribes its domination on docile bodies. Foucault demonstrates knowledge through vision is never neutral and is extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Foucault implies architecture is an element in the power/knowledge matrix through its complicity in the mechanisms of surveillance. The history of a visual artifact is never a documentary but a political narrative.

While Lacan's critique of the scopic regime of modernity is much more difficult to connect to historiography it is just as significant. Lacan has focused our attention on the reciprocity of the visual realm in the formation of identity. Visual information is never neutral, but constructed, by both the subject who is a receiver and the object or visual text that is in a sense transmitting. I will argue the psychoanalytic approach with its corresponding shift from the visual text or artifact toward the "spectator" or more precisely toward the spectator-text relations are central to the process of meaning, and have much to contribute to our understanding of architectural discourse. Viewing visual texts, whether painting, film, architecture or television in a spectator-text framework suggests a method of critical analysis that is both ancient and very modern. I will argue that the *techné* of classical rhetoric is well suited to unveiling the persuasive effects within the spectator-text dynamic.⁹

However, before ending this paper with a discussion of rhetoric, I will begin with a discussion of Foucault. In his chapter on "Panopticism" in *Discipline & Punish*, Foucault describes the gaze beginning with measures taken by local authorities to combat the spread of the plague. These measures are based on a system of surveillance, spatial segregation, and record keeping, as well as penalties. Foucault uses Bentham's Panopticon as the architectural realization of this system of surveillance. Foucault is clear that the Panopticon is not a dream building but a diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form. It is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use. It is polyvalent in its applications; it serves to reform prisoners, but also to treat patients, to instruct school children, to

confine the insane, to supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work. It is a type of configuration of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centers and channels of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, and prisons. Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used.¹⁰

Although Bentham's Panopticon was used to illustrate how the power of surveillance can operate, Foucault emphasizes that it is a metaphor, where one can be seen from any position and from multiple points. One is aware of being seen but does not see who is doing the looking. It is the effect that is important. In the case of the prison, the inmate is induced into a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.¹¹ According to Foucault whoever is subjected to a field of visibility and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; the subject makes them splay spontaneously upon itself; the subject inscribes in itself the power relation in which each simultaneously plays both roles; the subject becomes the principle of its own subjection.¹²

For Lacan the gaze penetrates the subject from all sides and is similar to Foucault's in that as the subject tries to adapt to it, the subject becomes the object. In his *Four Fundamental Concepts* Lacan stresses not only the otherness of the gaze, but its distinctness from what Lacan calls the eye. Although the gaze might be said to be "the presence of "Others" it is not necessarily any individual viewer, or group of viewers. It issues "from all sides," whereas the eye "sees only from one point." The gaze, moreover, is impossible to seize or get hold of.¹³

Lacan explains

*The gaze I encounter – you can find this in Sartre's own writing – is not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other. It is for this reason that le regard can include non-visual phenomena like the rustling of leaves. More important, the unseen character of the gaze meant it was not necessarily that of another subject looking threatening at the original subject, but might rather be understood as a function of the desire of the original subject, the desire for the object a...*¹⁴

The "object a" was Lacan's term for the object of lack or the missing object that will seemingly satisfy the drive for plenitude, "a" being the first letter of the French word for "other" (*l'autrui*). According to Lacan, at its most fundamental level, it is the phallus which the child (regardless of sex) wishes to be in order to make up for the mother's alleged lack of a penis. From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt to it.¹⁵

Lacan's account of subjectivity was developed in the context of a fiction he called the "Mirror Stage." There is a period in the child's development between the ages of six and 18 months where the infant is physically uncoordinated and is yet unable to walk or even to stand up.¹⁶ While in this state of powerlessness, the infant antici-

pates on the level of the imaginary the mastery of its own body. When a child sees its image in a mirror, it mistakes this unified whole for a superior self.¹⁷ The mirror can be the mother's face or anyone perceived as a whole.¹⁸ The child identifies with the mirror as something that both reflects the self and something other and finds in it a kind of unity that it cannot experience in its own body. The infant internalizes this image as an ideal ego and this process forms the basis for all other identifications, which are imaginary in principle.¹⁹

Lacan's account of the "Mirror Stage" elaborates the notion of exteriority which is internalized by the subject, first in the "gaze" of its mirror image and subsequently by parental imagoes, and later in the form of a whole range of cultural representations.²⁰ What Lacan designates, as the "gaze" appears initially external to the subject, first through the mother's look as it facilitates the "join" of infant and mirror. It is much later that the subject might be said to assume responsibility for "operating" the gaze by "seeing" itself being seen. Consciousness, as redefined by Lacan, hinges not only upon the internalization but also upon the "elision" or suppression of this gaze of oneself being seen.²¹ What determined (the subject), at the most profound level, in the visible, remarks Lacan, "is the gaze that is outside."²² Using a camera as a metaphor, Lacan states that it is through the gaze that the subject enters light and it is from the gaze that he or she receives its effects. Hence the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which the subject is photographed.²³

In his seminar, entitled "the Line and the Light," Lacan reformulated his discussion with superimposed triangles to illustrate the relationship between the eye and gaze. The first triangle represents the position of the eye, signified by Cartesian perspectivalist vision Alberti first described in *Della pittura*, in which the viewer's monocular eye was at the apex and the object at the opposite side of the triangle. The image was on another line parallel to that side, but halfway between it and the eye/apex. The second triangle, that of the gaze, put a point of light at the apex, the picture at the far wall, and what Lacan called the screen halfway between. Here the subject is placed not at the apex, but at the midpoint, as if it were an image on a screen in a generalized perceptual field, not a seeing eye. This subject, Lacan contended, "is caught, manipulated, captured in the field of vision."

Lacan's third diagram explicitly conflates the image in diagram 1 with the screen in diagram 2. Lacan inverts and superimposes his two visual triangles. The interposition of the two planes created a new figure in which the middle sections of both triangles, the image in that of the eye and the screen in that of the gaze, coincided in the form of a divided subject. At its center was an opaque line very different from the transparent window typical of the Albertian subject's view on the world.²⁴ (Figure 2) The "screen" is the image or group of images through which identity is constituted. Just as Lacan's infant can see him or herself only through the intervention of an external image, the gaze can "photograph" the object only through the grid of the screen.²⁵




Figure 1. Lacan's Diagrams of Vision

The screen is the culturally generated image or repertoire of images through which subjects are not only constituted, but also differentiated in relation to class, race, sexuality, age and nationality.²⁶ As Kaja Silverman points out, the possibility of "playing" with these images then assumes a critical importance for political resistance.²⁷ Lacan holds that the human subject is not entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. The subject maps itself in it. A person, in effect, knows how to play with the mask, as that beyond which there is the gaze. The screen is the locus of mediation."²⁸

In "The Gaze in the Expanded Field," Norman Bryson adopts Lacan's concept of the screen and applies it to analyze art.²⁹ Moreover, he applies it in the context of Foucault's discourse theory. A discourse for Foucault is a way in which knowledge is articulated in society by the both institutional and private forms. Knowledge produces and transmits power and influences social practices, ways of producing meaning, and all types of control. Things have no meaning outside their discourse, and each discourse is apart of a wider network of discourses.³⁰

Bryson places his notion of the gaze within the context of discourse. According to Bryson, for human beings collectively to orchestrate their visual experience they require socially agreed descriptions of an intelligible world. Vision is socialized. Any deviation from this social construction of visual reality can be measured and named as hallucination, misrecognition, or "visual disturbance." Between the subject and the world is inserted the entire sum of discourses which make up visibility, that cultural construct, and make visibility different from vision. Between retina and world is inserted a screen

of signs, a screen consisting of all the multiple discourses on vision built into the social arena.³¹ This network is greater than its individual agents or operators. As Bryson suggests when one learns to speak, you are inserted into a preexisting systems of discourse.

Similarly when you learn to see socially, that is, when I begin to articulate my retinal experience with the codes of recognition that come to me from my social milieu. I am inserted into systems of visual discourse that saw the world before I did, and will go on seeing that which exists independently of my life and outside it: my individual discoveries, the findings of my eye as it probes through the world, come to unfold in terms not of my making, and indifferent to my mortality.³²

Bryson notes how the painting "Ambassadors", by Hans Holbein exemplifies the screen that mortifies sight and demonstrates "everything I see is orchestrated with a cultural production of seeing that exists independently of my life and outside it."³³ The viewer standing directly in front of this painting will see the ambassadors as masters of learning, in possession of all the codes of knowledge, of science and of art. However their visual field is cut across by something they cannot master, the skull which casts itself sideways across their space, through anamorphosis.³⁴ (Figure 2) The skull was meant to signify man's mortality, but is also a reminder of an alternative visual order that the presence of the observer cannot efface. Holbein subverted and decentered the unified subject of vision constructed by the dominant scopic regime. It illustrates that the subject who sees is no more the center of visual experience than the subject of language at the center of speech.³⁵ The Ambassadors was also used by Lacan to demonstrate how the painting had captured the gaze.³⁶ Vision unfolds to the side of, and tangent to, the field of the other. And to that form of seeing Lacan calls seeing under the gaze.³⁷



Figure 2. *The Ambassadors*

Bryson points out that Lacan's gaze marks a fundamental shift away from a Cartesian perspectivalism, which was dominated by a theory of vision in which the truth lay in the retina, in the physiology of the eye and the neurology of the optical apparatus. We now understand vision as social construction which can be manipulated for political ends.³⁸ It reveals how power disguises and conceals its operations in visuality, in mythos of pure form, pure perception, and culturally universal vision. Lacan has demonstrated that what we see is not natural but constructed. He has described the role of the gaze in structuring both representation and identity. The very constitution of the self depends on this construction and is highly vulnerable to it.

The work of Foucault and Lacan have had far reaching implications for historiography in general and architectural history in particular. Foucault has challenged the assumptions implicit in historical method, the assumptions of objectivity and the myth of the "fact."³⁹

We know meaning is always the product of interpretation, facts are constructed by discourse and objectivity is a way to mask self interest by those in power. Every historian "shapes" his materials according to what Popper calls a "framework of preconceived ideas,"⁴⁰ or in accordance with his own narrative strategy, ideology, or system of ideas and values; Gadamer would call them prejudices. No one approaches a text innocently. The historian, like any writer of prose discourse fashions his materials. He may fashion them so as to make them conform to a "framework of preconceived ideas," of the sort that Popper ascribes to Hegel and Marx, or he may fashion them to a "preconceived selective point of view" of the sort the novelist occupies in his function as the narrator of a story.⁴¹ Stories of the founding of cities or states, of the origin of class differences and privileges, of fundamental social transformations by revolution and reform etc. are the subject matter of history. Levi-Strauss suggests all such stories whether presented under the aspect either of social science or history partake of the mythical inasmuch as they "cosmologize" or "naturalize" what are in reality nothing but human constructions which might well be other than what they happen to be.⁴² History, Levi-Strauss insists, is always written for a specific social group or public.⁴³

Foucault's influence on architectural history was immediate and is pervasive.⁴⁴ He has effected a shift in the way history is constructed and expanded the scope of its inquiry.⁴⁵ Foucault's challenge of "origins," in favor of genealogy, his introduction of discourse and *épistème* have become commonplace. The role of the scopic regime in architecture is acknowledged and has been investigated.⁴⁶ Architectural historians have also appropriated Lacan's contribution to psychoanalysis through his notion of the gaze. Spaces are now often described as pre-Oedipal⁴⁷ and analyzed in terms of the gaze and spectatorship.⁴⁷ Psychopathologies of urban space have become the subject of psychoarchitectural analysis.⁴⁸

However, I believe Lacan's more significant contribution has been adopted by film and communication theorists who have used the psychoanalytic approach to shift the focus from the film or artifact towards the "spectator," or more precisely toward the spectator-text

(or object-subject) relations, that are central to the process of meaning-production in film.⁴⁹ Communication analysis and media critics have turned to the discipline of rhetoric, to assist them in analyzing the text-spectator relation implicit in television and film. Because the central question in rhetoric is who are you trying to influence and what is the most effective means of doing so, the audience, or spectator becomes central. Critics read television shows, commercials, and movies as texts, to see how discourse is structured and organized, and to examine what kind of effects these forms and devices produce in their readers, viewers, or users. For instance, a television commercial can be analyzed rhetorically through mode of address, form, style, and other discursive techniques and strategies to discover how advertisers use market research into our values to gain our sympathies and ultimately persuade us to buy their products.⁵⁰

The ancient discipline of rhetoric, which was the received form of critical analysis developed by the Greeks and continued to the eighteenth century examined the way discourses were constructed in order to achieve certain effects. While the classical rhetorician would not have had access to market research he or she would have been a keen observer of the human condition and would have very carefully considered mode of address, form, style and their effect on an intended audience. Its objects of enquiry could be spoken or written, poetry or philosophy, fiction, historiography and the arts. Leon Battista Alberti used his knowledge of classical rhetoric in his discourse on the arts and architecture and eventually to design buildings.⁵¹ Rhetoric's horizon can extend to the entire field of discursive practices in society as a whole, and in identifying forms of power and performance.⁵² Architecture is a rhetorical artifact that identifies and appeals to certain audiences. It has the power to enlighten or inhibit, restrain or empower, foreground certain groups and background others. Since rhetoric has always focussed on the spectator-text operation, it is a particularly useful tool in critical historiography.

Lacan and Foucault's critique of our ocularcentric culture is a continuation of an ancient tension between the epistemology of vision and its interpretation. Ancient philosophers realized that sight was the most important source of knowledge yet distrusted visual information. Foucault extends the critique of the epistemology of vision by exposing its operations through the gaze in the power/knowledge matrix. Lacan unpacks the effects of the gaze in the formation of identity and by focusing on the importance of the reciprocity implicit in *le regard* for the subject-text relationship, has made a significant contribution to historiography. Foucault's concept of discourse and Lacan's notion of the screen remind us that all historical sources are constructions, interpretation is never neutral but screened by ideologies or frameworks. Interpretation is always partial, polarized and necessarily provisional. I would like to end this paper by returning to the Greek notion of spectator and theory as elaborated by the philosopher Diogenes. Diogenes believed "life is like a festival: just as some come to the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, but the best people come as spectators (*theatai*)."⁵³ The nobility of the spectator lies in their "active nonparticipation," allowing them to judge the actors involved in the competition. History might be compared to the competition that draws those who

come to ply their trade, or compete for fame or search for truth. I would agree with Diogenes that the best historians come as “active nonparticipants,”⁵⁴ as spectators who understand their role in the world of the spectated.

NOTES

¹David Summers, *The Judgement of Sense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 32.

²Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt: The Activity of the Spectator,” in *Sites of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1997): Birmingham is discussing Arendt’s understanding of the term theory. She quotes her quoting Diogenes “Life is like a festival: just as some come to the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, but the best people come as spectators (theatai), so in life the slavish men go hunting for fame (doxa) or gain, the philosophers for truth.” The nobility of the spectators lies in their “active nonparticipation,” allowing them to judge the actors involved in the competition. The concern for fame or opinion makes the actor in the event dependent on the spectator’s judgment. It is through the opinion of the audience and the judge that fame comes about.

³David Michael Levin “Keeping Foucault and Derrida in Sight,” in *Sites of Vision* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997): 400

⁴Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javenovich, 1978): 110-111.

⁵Barbara Maria Stafford, *Body Criticism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991): 474

⁶Ibid. p. 2.

⁷Summers, p. 42.

⁸Foucault, *Birth of the Clinic*, p. 39.

⁹Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1991): 14-16. By classifying rhetoric as a *techné*, Aristotle was locating it in a philosophical landscape and giving it a structure of its own. He makes clear the central purpose of rhetoric is the detection in any given subject matter its persuasive aspects. Rhetoric is given a universality that gives it an affinity with dialectic.

¹⁰Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979): 205.

¹¹Ibid. p. 202.

¹²Ibid. p.203.

¹³Kaja Silverman, “Fassbinder and Lacan: A Reconsideration of Gaze, Look and Image,” *Camera Obscura* 19 (July 1991): p. 59. Silverman argues that feminist film theory which equates the male voyeur with the gaze. She points out that it is at precisely the moment when the eye is placed to the keyhole that it is likeliest to find itself subordinated to the gaze. It is at this moment, which Lacan observed that the subject finds itself disturbed, surprised by the gaze, and reduced to shame.

¹⁴Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994): 362.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977): 1.

¹⁷Ibid. p. 2 Lacan states that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as *Gestalt*, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent that constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting size (un relief de stature) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him.

¹⁸J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, trans (New York: Donald Nicholson, 1973): 250. I have relied on Laplanche and Pontalis repeatedly to translate Lacan’s notoriously obscure discourse.

¹⁹Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, “Psychoanalysis, Film, and Television,” in *Channels of Discourse. Reassembled* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992): 208.

²⁰Jacqueline Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 1986): 53. Rose points out that Lacan is careful to stress that misrecognition is not restricted to the field of the visible alone, but the mirror should be understood as an object which reflects – not just the visible, but also what is heard, touched and willed by the child.

²¹Kaja Silverman, “Fassbinder and Lacan: A Reconsideration of Gaze, Look and Image,” *Camera Obscura* 19 (July 1991): 57.

²²Ibid.

²³Jacque Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (W.W. Norton: New York, 1978): 106.

²⁴Jay, p. 365.

²⁵Silverman, p. 76.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts*, p. 107

²⁹Norman Bryson, “The Gaze in the Expanded Field,” *Vision and Visuality*, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988): 87-108.

³⁰Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972): 33. Foucault describes the discursive field of medicine. “It was no longer a group of traditions, observations, and heterogeneous practices, but of a corpus of knowledge that presupposed the same way of looking at things, the same divisions of the perceptual field, the same analysis of the pathological fat in accordance with the visible space of the body, the same system of transcribing what one perceived in what one said (same vocabulary, same play of metaphor); in short, it seem to me that medicine was organized as a series of descriptive statements.”

³¹Ibid. p. 92.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Lacan used the Ambassadors to illustrate the gaze. Using a technique called anamorphosis an extreme case of perspective, where the viewpoint is at the side, and near the plan, of the picture itself. When viewed from this point or as a reflection of a curved mirror, the image returns to normal. Alison Cole, *Perspective* (London, 1992): 32, 33. Spectators viewing the Ambassadors must simply discover the improbable viewpoint – about 6 1/2 feet to the right of the edge of the painting, at the eye level of the two ambassadors – to unscramble the skull image and so understand its symbolic meaning.

³⁵Ibid. 93.

³⁶Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts*, p. 89. The skull makes visible the subject as annihilated.

³⁷Bryson, p. 94.

³⁸Ibid. p. 107.

³⁹Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession*. In his ambitious book Novick traces the development and importance of the myth “objectivity” to the American Historical Profession and discusses Foucault’s challenge to this concept.

⁴⁰Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination In Nineteen-Century Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973): 102.

⁴¹Ibid. p. 106.

⁴²Ibid. p. 102.

⁴³Ibid. p. 104.

⁴⁴Manfredo Tafuri, *The Sphere and the Labyrinth* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987): 3-21 Tafuri’s book was published in Italian in 1980. Tafuri discusses the implications of both Foucault and Lacan to architectural history.

⁴⁵Foucault’s challenge of “origins,” in favor of genealogy, his introduction of discourse and épistème, have become commonplace.

⁴⁶Alice T. Friedman, “Architecture, Authority, and the Female Gaze: Planning and Representation in the Early Modern Country House,” *Assemblage* 18 (1992): 43. She uses Lacan’s notion of the ‘gaze’ to focus on the role of visuality and vision in the creation of categories that create identities and confer authority and powerlessness.

⁴¹Beatriz Colomina, *Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass Media* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994): 9 Colomina describes the modern transformation of the house produced by spaces defined by walls of (moving images). This is the space of media, of publicity of spectatorship.

⁴²Anthony Vidler, *Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000)

⁴³Sandy Flitterman-lewis, p. 210.

⁴⁴Mike Budd, Steve Craig and Clay Steinman, *Consuming Environments: Television and Commercial Culture* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999): 100.

⁴⁵Hanna H. Gray, "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit Of Eloquence," *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Dec. 1963): 506. The humanists applied to their analysis of many disciplines the ideas of the vocabulary of rhetoric. Alberti, for instance, adapted the teachings of ancient rhetoric to the formulation of an 'art' of painting. In their discussions of the 'art' of history, Renaissance humanists utilized rhetorical doctrines in describing the structure and purposes of historical writing and defined history within the classification of eloquence. The humanists also assimilated the concepts of rhetoric to precepts of another nature. The terms "*decorum*" and "*imitatio*," for example, are central in both rhetoric and moral philosophy, and the humanists often appear to fuse their meaning whatever the context. Thus, the imitation of stylistic and of ethical models are spoken of in iden-

tical terms; or the idea of always speaking appropriately, of suiting style and manner to subject, aim, and audience is treated as the exact analogue of behaving with decorum, of choosing the actions and responses which are best in harmony with and most appropriate to individual character and principles on the one hand, the nature of circumstances on the other. p. 506.

⁴⁶Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, 2nd edition. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996): 179 Eagleton proposes rhetorical analysis of 'discursive practices' replace literary theory, which he views as an illusion.

⁴⁷Refer to footnote 3.

⁴⁸Leo Braudy, *The Frenzy of Renown* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997): 33. Diogenes knew a little about life and by extension historiography and a lot about power. When Alexander the Great was in Corinth, he went to visit the Diogenes and found him sitting under a tree. Alexander left his military escort to approach Diogenes and asked him what he could do for him. Stay out of the way, Diogenes said, you're blocking the sun. The soldiers were horrified, expecting one of Alexander's famous outbursts of anger. But Alexander just laughed and remarked that if he were not Alexander, he would like to be Diogenes.