

Radical Psychiatry and the Unconscious of the City: Henri Lefebvre, A Case Study

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INTRODUCTION

The notion of the unconscious is found throughout the work of the French Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre's concept of the unconscious is seen as a transformation from a sociological model to one that embraced the urban construct as an analog to the psychical production of space. Building upon the normative interpretation of the Freudian definition of the unconscious, Lefebvre embraced and transformed the idea throughout his *oeuvre*, and eventually constructed a concept that allied his work with a radical branch of psychiatry known as anti-psychiatry.

Although he never directly notes his debt to the work of the anti-psychiatrist movement and (most notably) the work of Felix Guattari¹ and Gilles Deleuze, there is little doubt that the development of his thought in this area was directly related to this radical movement. Their conceptualization of the unconscious was one that relied upon the destruction of established ideas of the psyche as a repressive, enclosing formation, and promoted the conception of the psyche as a productive, desiring matrix. This model can be seen as the underpinning to his seminal critique of spatial practices *The Production of Space*, 1974.

This paper examines Lefebvre's understanding of the unconscious and relates this to his philosophy of the structuring of the urban environment and the production of space. It proposes that Lefebvre's conceptualization of space and the construct of the city is dependent upon a psychological model which, in turn, uses spatial metaphors and topological systems to support its construct.

EARLY INFLUENCES

Lefebvre had an early association with the Surrealists group in Paris in the 1920s, and one of the main interests of the Surrealists, that of psychoanalysis and psychology, stayed with him throughout his life. He was especially interested in the idea of reaching the unconscious through creative action.² It has been suggested that early on Lefebvre had embraced the Freudian notion of the unconscious, but that in the late 1950s and early 1960s (with the reinvention and rediscovery of Freudian theory in the work of Lacan), he saw the unconscious as having become a fetishized object.

In his view, Freud had conceptualized sexuality and brought to light sexual misery, but psychoanalysis had in turn generated an ideology of normality and mythology of desire. Without making capitalism the sole reason for sexual misery, psychoanalysis has a tendency to ignore it and the State. Furthermore, for Freud, like Heidegger, difference disappears in such a way that the masculine represents the universal. In particular he poured scorn on Lacan whom he called an *escroc* (swindler) and a *fumiste* (not serious) because he dared speak about women, sex

and the libido without knowing what he was talking about! The dislike of Lacan is also likely to have stemmed from his psychoanalytical practices and relationship to his analysands.³

To understand the psychological foundations from which Lefebvre's theoretical stance developed it is important to briefly explain Freud's construction. Freud's structuring of the mind is seen as consisting of three divisions: Conscious (Cs.), Preconscious (Pcs.), and the Unconscious (Ucs.). He equates the Conscious with the perceptual system, the sending and ordering of the external world; the Preconscious covers those elements of experience which can be called into consciousness at will (latency); and the Unconscious is all that has been kept out of the preconscious/conscious system. According to Freud's third version (or correction) of this construct in *The Ego and The Id*, 1923, the Unconscious does not "coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is Ucs., but not all that is Ucs. is repressed."⁴ The unconscious is dynamic, consisting of instinctual representatives, ideas, and images.

We have learnt from psychoanalysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens we say of the idea that it is in a state of being "unconscious," and we can produce good evidence to show that even when it is unconscious it can produce effects, even including some which finally reach consciousness... How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious.⁵

Drs. J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis in their comprehensive dictionary of Freud's concepts *Vocabulaire de Psychanalyse (The Language of Psycho-Analysis)* describe the Freudian unconscious as primarily and indissolubly "a topographical and dynamic notion," a map set in motion, that should not be relegated to a pictured "second consciousness" but should be seen as "a system with its own contents, mechanisms and – perhaps – a specific "energy."⁶

We can note from the description above that the concepts of *topography* or *topographical* are associated with the idea of the Unconscious. By topography Freud means a "theory or point of view which implies a differentiation of the psychical apparatus into a number of subsystems. Each of these has distinct characteristics or functions and a specific position vis-a-vis the others, so that they may be treated, metaphorically speaking, as points in a psychical space which is susceptible of figurative representation."⁷ This topographical mapping of the Unconscious gives rise to an idea of spatial differentiation, a psychical juxtaposition which layers and struc-

tures—creating figurative rooms and spaces of trace and memory.

If we can consider the Unconscious as a construct of consciousness, then we can extend the metaphor of architecture and its' Unconscious a bit further. In architecture, the act of covering the ground creates a site. The idea that architecture in its most simple terms creates or produces a space (covers the site, differentiates that site, creates a topography) is analogous to the space that Psycho-Analysis constructs for the Unconscious and the Conscious. The city creates a site by continuously covering up, exposing, repressing, and then building. The outward manifestation of the city can be seen as the Conscious, it is the objective, projected manifestation of a process. Perhaps the Unconscious of the city can be seen as the repressed history that continuously manifests itself and reminds the dweller that it still remains hidden under layers of objective culture, or it could be the individual will and creativity of the subject who is forced to repress certain drives that may be counter-productive to his successful integration into society.

LEFEBVRE'S FIRST MODEL OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Lefebvre's usage of the term unconscious can be traced to a colloquium in which he participated in 1960. The colloquium, the 6th at Bonneval, France, was entitled "*L'inconscient*" (The Unconscious) and was attended by intellectuals such as Lefebvre, Dr. Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dr. Jean Laplanche, Dr. Serge Lebovici, and Paul Ricoeur. This colloquium was one in a series first organized by Henri Ey in 1947 that delved into the nature of certain psychogenic processes. Previous sessions were on *Heredity, Psychogenesis of psychosis and neurosis*, and *The Psychiatrique Evolution*. At this session, Lefebvre put forth his conception of the unconscious and its relation to sociology.⁸

To understand Lefebvre's conceptualization of the unconscious as both an objective quality of the city and a subjective aspect of society in general, it is necessary to trace the development of his thought on the subject. We can break down his work on the unconscious into three distinct periods. The first major thought he gives publicly to the subject is at the Colloquium at Bonneval. Here, as is stated above, he is in the presence of Jacques Lacan, with whom he neither agrees, nor likes. He is at the conference to give a sociological reading of the unconscious. By 1967, in his essay "The Right to the City," he has moved from his purely sociologically constructed reading of the unconscious, to a broader conceptualization of a metaphorical unconscious of the city. Here, his reading is of an "urban fabric" that is seen as a separator between the individual, the group, and the buildings themselves as constitutive of the city, and the chaos that lies below waiting to extrude its contents into a revolutionary situation; this thought process that begins to read the city itself, as opposed to pure everyday life, clearly illustrates his collaboration with the Situationist project. By 1974, in *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre has ingested his interest in space, architecture, and the city as productive forces and has begun to conceptualize a non-repressive unconscious force that is, in turn, capable of production.

In his presentation for the Colloquium at Bonneval, Lefebvre called for a re-thinking of the way the unconscious is depicted. He says that we can no longer see the unconscious as simply the Cartesian cogito, the thesis of the transparent conscious—identified with itself and as the prototype of intelligibility, or the Hegelian dialectic between the conscious and the unconscious. He also discounts an understanding of the conscious as the major fundamental force of the psyche. He believes that these views discount any other kind of perspective whether it be on abnormal or deviant, in brief, the pathological. He sees these views as discounting a determinable connection between the conscious and the known. He believes that in these views there is neither theory nor practice—simply incertitude and radical contingency in all domains. Instead, Lefebvre proposes that we work with four models for the uncon-

scious/conscious relationship and that these models be predicated upon social forces. He says this because he believes that the individual is inseparable from the social. (*L'être humain individuel est social*) He sees the verb "to be" (*est*) as not meaning "here" or designating an ontological or logical identity. "To be" must recover a multiplicity of dialectical determinations.⁹

The first of the four sociological models¹⁰ that he proposes "puts the accent on the relative character (on absolute and not substantial) of the unconscious. He describes the dialectic between life (as in a lived life) and life (as in the greater metaphysical meaning). This dialectic is delineated by language. To understand the connection the idea of grammatical structure, particularly pronouns, is examined. There is the greater structure (structure) and the more minute idea of the set (conjuncture). This dialectic structure/set is constructed of two terms, neither of which is absolute, but where their meaning and their eventual conflict play an important role. The set expresses the structure and the structure signifies a union or a set. This brings us to the pronouns of I (*je*) and we (*nous*). Here he distinguishes between the group as having a conscious—a being the interaction between individuals—and also as having an unconscious. The we (*nous*) is well understood, it is the law of *my* conscious and substance. We is inferior to I and me. The distinction between I, me, and we operates in the we specifically. Finally, he calls this distinction to be the dialectic of the conscious—it is the movement between the infra-conscious (I, me) and the supra-conscious (*we*). It is here that Lefebvre sees alienation taking place. If one mingles the I, the me, and the we, one omits the distance between the different levels. These concepts must be kept separate yet in constant flux. It is in the space between these concepts that society happens. If this space between is collapsed, alienation steps in, as the individual is no longer able to see himself apart from the whole. Here, the dialectic of the unconscious happens in the actual—in the space of lived experience.

In his second model of the unconscious, Lefebvre says that he wishes to correct the mistakes of the first. The first model is faulty because it contains allusions to history without actually explaining and giving its historical place. The second model will correct these mistakes, while not forgetting the advantages of the first model. Here, Lefebvre sets out by defining two different historical processes: the cumulative process and the non-cumulative process. The cumulative process, like the accumulation of capital, relies upon reason and rationality. They (the cumulative processes) are the cause and the effect, basically, the foundation of society. The non-cumulative processes are the arts, morals, ideologies, for the most part culture. The non-cumulative processes rely upon sense, affect and emotion. Lefebvre describes cumulative processes as being represented by an ascending spiral and the non cumulative processes as being like a circle or a cycle. The second model of the unconscious transports the distinction and contrast of processes of the individual to the interior of consciousness and allows us to think of the unconscious as an accretive process.

In the third model Lefebvre sketches out the distinction between expression and signification. He says that the two are often confused and their distinction needs to be made clear. For Lefebvre, signification is attached to an arbitrary sign; it is fixed, conventional, and formal. Expression, on the other hand, reveals a hidden reality; it is always unexpected and surprising. In social practice (and in human life in general), expression is never separated completely from a repertory or a code of signs (signification) which permit an immediate expression of a certain concept. Except in a certain number of limited cases (shrieks and noise), expression is not communicable without signification. Hence, signification relies upon expression and expression dies soon if there is not signification. This, Lefebvre says, is a dialectic rapport. An example he gives of this in terms of sociology is the idea of a dream (*rêve*) which is considered an expression of a sign which is social. He says that normally, the movement between expression and signification moves along with-

out confusion. He sees this model as expression the difference between the *Je* (I) and the *Moi* (*me*) of the first model. The individual (*Je*) is the expression of society (*nous*). Society is the sign and the individual the expression of that sign. Alienation is defined by the distortion between the conscious and the self. Is the self a product or expression of the greater sign of society or is the self an expression of oneself? This ambiguity gives rise to the notion of the unconscious. The unconscious comes in when there is confusion between the expression and the signification—the I and the me. Am I simply an expression of an archetypal societal sign, or do I express a nature which is solely me, not in relation to a greater whole? Are my dreams and my dreaming an expression of me or we?

Finally, in the fourth model Lefebvre says that the sociological study of ideology is obliged to distinguish between two types, or two genres, of contradictions: soluble contradictions, where they appear in and from representation, and insoluble contradictions coming in and from representation. Soluble contradictions are those contradictions in social practice which are obliged to invent new representations for problems that cannot be solved by old models. An example of this is when lawyers invent new laws because the old ones no longer suffice. Another example would be when philosophers discover new representations of the "totality" when the practice of philosophy has changed. In both these cases the fundamental structuring devices are left unchanged. Hence, lawyers do not touch legal principles and philosophers do not touch the principles that hold together philosophical systems. In insoluble contradictions, one finds their solution existing in confusion/chaos, a reshuffling of those problems posed themselves by social practice. It is these contradictions, historically, that produce revolutionary situations. Here, juridical, philosophical, and ethical principles are shocked because the conflicts attain such a profound degree that they cannot be resolved under the plan of representation and ideologies that already exists. Lefebvre then asks us to transpose these schemes to the individual conscious. He asks "Can we not constitute for the individual these two genres of conflictual situations: those which are resolvable by a change in representation of ideas, attitudes, and projects and those which are unresolvable by this recourse. In the first case an amendment to representation permits the individual to resolve (more or less) their problems. In the second case, it is necessary for him to reconcile with his past, his existence, with his given and with his problems." Lefebvre then asks the reader to allow him to extend this idea further: "Isn't there frequently, for the individual, confusion between these two models of contradiction. Isn't this the given misunderstanding of the nature of conflictual situations. What practical criteria is at our disposal to understand this? The idea that comes out of this is that, often, there are insoluble contradictions in the psyche that cannot be merely reasoned away or worked through. These contradictions may have their origin in the unconscious and therefore are insoluble in the terms of the social construct. *By looking at the model of the delirious person who constructs his own world through illusory representation* (emphasis added), we may have some insight into who insoluble contradictions are resolved through a certain pathological system. This call to the model of the delirious person as a potential site of resolution may be Lefebvre's first attempt at integrating radical psychiatric ideas into this work.

Lefebvre sums up his presentation by noting that his four models are all distinct yet still complement each other in many ways. They are all sociological and they are all forced to rely on singular individuals and the particularities of social groups (the collective us, the communal language of the members of the groups, and the problems in which social practice plays a role). He calls upon the plurality of these models, but says that there are individual singularities and pathologies that cannot be conceived in these models. Basically, he believes that there has to be a reevaluation of the current medical and psychoanalytic models and that by looking to his models of the unconscious as a social construct there can be a

potential rethinking of how the unconscious is depicted.

THE UNCONSCIOUS OF THE CITY

By 1967, Lefebvre has begun to depict the unconscious in terms of an identifiable social space. In his collection of essays entitled *The Right to the City*, Lefebvre introduces the concept of an "urban core" a site that has the potential to split open and reveal itself, to show that it has maintained itself throughout the repeated crises that have constructed the "urban reality."¹¹ For Lefebvre it is the city, as opposed to the "home" of Heidegger, that symbolizes the consciousness of the individual. A close reader of Heidegger, Lefebvre reacted against his closed reading of the dwelling as the ultimate site of reality. For Lefebvre, this reading dismissed the reality of the social which was, for him, the most important mediating force in the production of the individual and from there the production of space. Lefebvre centers his critique on an idea about the "crisis of the city." The crisis of the city is the continual appearance of the "urban core" which refuses to disappear. His reading of the city begins with the concept of an "urban fabric."

This metaphor is not clear. More than a fabric thrown over a territory, these words designate a kind of biological proliferation of a net of uneven mesh, allowing more or less extended sectors to escape: hamlets or villages, entire regions. . . The "urban-rural" relation does not disappear. On the contrary, it intensifies itself down to the most industrialized countries. It interferes with other representations and other real relations: town and country, nature and artifice, etc. Here and there tensions become conflicts, latent conflicts are accentuated and then what was hidden under the urban fabric appears in the open. Moreover, urban cores do not disappear. The fabric erodes them or integrates them into its web. These cores survive by transforming themselves.¹²

Lefebvre's "urban core" and conception of "latent conflicts" can be directly identified with the Freudian notion of the Unconscious. For him, the ultimate battle is less metaphorical and more about the crisis between the city as a center of power and the village as a site of, perhaps, a more rarefied reality. The crisis of the city is the problem of the urban core which splits open and maintains itself. Like the Unconscious, the urban core refuses to remain covered by new layers of reality and it manifests itself—strongly asserting itself as the center of power. Lefebvre goes on to discuss the concept of "urban order" and in doing so, refers to the "consciousness of the city and urban reality..." The consciousness of the city is its outward appearance and Lefebvre finds the suburban and urban fabric (with their appearing cores) to be in a crisis of existence.

For Lefebvre there is a discontinuity in theory or thought that sees the city as a site of ideological investigation and implementation and the city as *metalanguage*. This discontinuity is evidenced by the purely formal investigation into the topology and conscious manifestations of the city without looking into the underlying causes that manifest these forms of behavior. Lefebvre introduces his conceptualization of the unconscious of the city as that which lies below this immediate reality. To know the city is to practice the space of the city; this practice engages a mapping of the city that unearths the unconscious conflicts that lie beneath immediate reality—those repressed, yet inhabited, spaces that are latent to the urban text.

Yes, the city can be read because it writes, because it is writing. However, it is not enough to examine this without recourse to context. To write on this writing or language, to elaborate the *metalanguage of the city* is not to know the city and the urban. The context, what is *below* the text to decipher (daily life, immediate relations, the *unconscious*¹³ of the urban, what little is said and of which even less is written), hides itself in the inhabited spaces—sexual and family life—and rarely confronts

itself and what is above this urban text (institutions ideologies), cannot be neglected in the deciphering.¹⁴

THE PRODUCTIVE URBAN UNCONSCIOUS

The “unconscious of the urban,” as quoted above, is revisited by Lefebvre in his 1974 polemic *The Production of Space*. This text marries his earlier critique of everyday life and capitalist production and repressions, with his new call for a theory of spatial production. A close reading identifies many of the main concepts as influenced by the 1972 work of the radical psychiatrist Felix Guattari and the philosopher Gilles Deleuze.

These works have their basis in an intellectual movement that laid beneath and conflicted with the hegemonic discourse of psychiatry and psychoanalysis: this was the anti-psychiatry movement. Beginning in the late 1950s a concept and a movement known as anti-psychiatry developed in London and took hold across the continent. This movement was brought to the forefront of psychoanalytic/psychiatric thought, as well as intellectual thought, by four prominent “existential” psychiatrists: R.D. Laing, David Cooper, Aaron Esterson, and Joseph Berke. Anti-psychiatry was seen as a political movement as well as a medical one. The movement sought to free the patient (and human being in general) from the repressive and alienating hold of psychiatric oppression. For the anti-psychiatrist, the fundamental ideology “begins with the rejection of medical and psychiatric definitions of mental illness; its ultimate goal is to smash the enormous power wielded by the mental health system... Psychiatry is the official institution within our scientific/industrial society authorized to control and punish all persons unable and/or unwilling to fit into their roles that society demands.”¹⁵ The anti-psychiatry idea was immediately embraced by radical (and often Marxist) groups in the intellectual communities of London and Paris. The novelty of these views was seen as a refreshing panacea to the stronghold that Freudianism had taken with Lacan’s re-reading of his work.

French anti-psychiatry is particularly interesting as it relates to the French psychiatric movement. At its outset in the 50s and early 60s, French anti-psychiatry was not anti-Freud *per se*, but built upon Lacan’s re-reading of Freud. It attempted to correct what they saw as problems in Freud’s text, namely, the idea of a “normal” subject, and desire as a lack.¹⁶ As Sherry Turkle describes in her seminal work *Psychoanalytic Politics: Jacques Lacan and Freud’s French Revolution*, French psychiatry was historically “anti-psychoanalytic” and anti-Freud. The French social theorists, novelists, and psychiatrists saw “rootedness” (as in the harmony and security of life) as being connected to the rural provinces.¹⁷ This was seen as a “near pre-requisite for mental health.” Turkle states that “Freud’s notion of the Ucs. conflicted with the importance that the French put on the possibility of the rational control of one’s life and on the conscious manipulation of one’s own talents.”¹⁸ According to Turkle, French psychiatry, even into the 1950s and 60s, “continued to express its nostalgia for a simpler, more rooted life in the provinces. French psychiatric studies spoke of the pathology inherent in urban life and warned that leaving ‘organic and alive’ rural settings for ‘artificial’ urban ones would have only the most deleterious effects on mental health... French psychiatry served to bolster a social ideology that glorified rural life and traditional values.”¹⁹ Thus, we can surmise that the anti-psychiatry movement in France was engaged in a ideological struggle that encompassed the modern polemic between the city and country.

The city is the contested space for Lefebvre in the first chapter of *The Production of Space*. Here, Lefebvre once again announces his dismissal of orthodox psychoanalytic thought (with his eye on Lacan) which posits the Oedipal complex at the heart of all conflict: thwarted desire.

The trouble with this thesis is that it assumes the logical,

epistemological and anthropological priority of language over space. By the same token, it puts prohibitions – among them that against incest – and not productive activity, at the origin of society. The pre-existence of an objective neutral and empty space is simply taken as read, and only true space of speech (and writing) is dealt with as something that must be created. These assumptions obviously cannot become the basis for an adequate account of social/spatial practice. They apply only to an imaginary society, an ideal type or model of society which this ideology dreams up and the arbitrarily identifies with all “real” societies.... It is true that explaining everything in psychoanalytic terms, in terms of the unconscious, can only lead to overestimation of the “structural.” Yet structures do exist, and there is such a thing as the “unconscious.” Such little-understood aspects of consciousness would provide sufficient justification in themselves for research in this area. *If it turned out, for instance, that every society, and particularly (for our purposes) the city, had an underground and repressed life, and hence an “unconscious” of its own, there can be no doubt that interest in psychoanalysis, at present on the decline, would get a new lease on life.*²⁰

There are a number of ideas at work in this passage. First, he is railing against Jacques Lacan and the structuralists (and even post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida) who wish to posit language and writing at the head of the field of philosophical, psychological, and sociological inquiry. For Lefebvre, the space that exists before language, the space which he sees as haven been passed over by this critique, is the place where society (and the city) is truly formed. Secondly, he believes that if we can posit this passed over space as the originary grounding of consciousness (as opposed to language), then the practice of psychoanalysis will have a renewed agenda.

Lefebvre sets forward his wish to create a “science of space” which will allow space to be thought of as a productive entity. He reflects upon the agenda of Surrealism and seems to suggest that they were the first modern practice to think of space in a new way. “[T]he leading surrealists sought to decode inner space and illuminate the nature of the transition from this subjective space to the material realm of the body and the outside world, and thence to social life.”²¹ Lefebvre states that every society produces a space (its own space), and if social transformation is truly to take affect, then it must be revolutionary in character. To rethink the space of the unconscious as a productive force, as opposed to a holding place for repressed desire, and to think society as having an unconscious which will then become a productive force is, for Lefebvre, a revolutionary concept, and one that directly aligns him with the tenets of anti-psychiatry.

Lefebvre (following and building upon Deleuze and Guattari’s work) calls for a new conception of the unconscious. He sees the unconscious as a social construct, and as a constructor of society. For both, the only way that society can be constructed and sustained is by a recourse to the world the psychotic. Lefebvre had initially proposed this idea in his presentation for the colloquium at Bonneval. To look to the way that the psychotic constructs his reality as a potential model for revolutionary behavior, as opposed to this behavior as a model of deviance from the social norm.

Lefebvre, along with the anti-psychiatry movement, proposes a model of the individual who creates space. The space that is created by the schizophrenic, is the space of an alternative reality, a reality that is not presupposed by the dominant oppression of fascistic thinking.

The Production of Space rests at the apogee of a certain set of ideas that was set in motion by Lefebvre’s earlier work in the *The Critique of Everyday Life*, the radical intellectual movements of the late 1950s and 1960s, and finally, Deleuze and Guattari’s distillation of these concepts in their ground-breaking work *Anti-Oedipus*. The idea that space is both productive and also produced is an entirely new

concept; yet Lefebvre's, often unqualified, debt to these previously mentioned methodologies is essential, and therefore necessary to understand his critique.

NOTES

- ¹ Felix Guattari was a French psychoanalyst, trained by Jacques Lacan. According to Brian Massumi in his *User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (see note 28), from 1960 onward, Guattari "collaborated on group projects dedicated to developing a radical "institutional psychotherapy" and later he became engaged with an uneasy alliance with the international antipsychiatry group spearheaded by R.D. Laing in England and Franco Basaglia in Italy. As Lacanian schools of psychoanalysis gained ground against psychiatry, the contractual Oedipal relationship between the analyst and the transference bound analysand became as much Guattari's target as the legal bondage of the institutionalized patient in conventional state hospitals."
- ² Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, "Introduction" to *Writing on Cities* by Henri Lefebvre, translated by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p.29. Lefebvre coupled this interest and research with elements from the work of a Brazilian philosopher Enriro dos Santos Peinheiro. Peinheiro was interested in what he saw as the rhythms that permeate everyday life—unconscious manifestations that guide both society and the individual. Lefebvre was introduced to these concepts through the work of Georg Bachelard (1884-1962), who had traced the origins of rhythmanalysis to Peinheiro. Lefebvre took up the idea of rhythmanalysis in *The Production of Space* and announces it as a project in *Critique de la vie quotidienne* (1981). In his engagement of rhythmanalysis, Lefebvre had hoped that rhythmanalysis would complement or be a replacement for psychoanalysis.
- ³ Ibid. footnote text.
- ⁴ Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, translated by Joan Riviere and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1960), p.8.
- ⁵ Ibid., p.573.
- ⁶ J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 475.
- ⁷ Ibid., p.476.
- ⁸ Henri Ey, *L'Inconscient: Vle Colloque de Bonneval*, Bibliothèque Neuro-Psychiatrique de Langue Française (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966)
- ⁹ Henri Lefebvre, *L'Inconscient:....*, pp.347..-348.
- ¹⁰ The translation of Lefebvre's presentation at the Colloquium is mine, and therefore, fairly inexact. I have tried to retain the sense of his concepts without going into extreme detail.
- ¹¹ Henri Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities...*, translated by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996)

¹² Ibid. pp.72.-73

¹³ Bold face mine.

¹⁴ Lefebvre, "Continuities and Discontinuities," in *Writing on Cities*, p.108.

¹⁵ K. Portland Frank, *The Anti-Psychiatry Bibliography and Resource Guide*, 2nd. ed. revised and expanded (Vancouver: Press Gang, 1979), pp.11-12.

¹⁶ Sherry Turkle, *Psychoanalytic Politics: Jaques Lacan and Freud's French Revolution* (New York: The Guildford Press, 1992), pp.145-147.

¹⁷ Ibid, p.34.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.37.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1991), orig. publ.in France as *Production de l'espace* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1974), pp.35-6.

²¹ Ibid. p.18.

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