

# The “Tenths” Experiment: Spatial Assimilation of Indigenous Populations in the Towns of “Wakefield” Colonies

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## INTRODUCTION

Most analyses of nineteenth century British colonization focus on India and South East Asia. In these populous regions, indigenous cultures often had strong urban traditions and colonial town planning concentrated on bi-polar structures with separate European and “Native” components.<sup>1</sup> However, during the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain founded a series of “settler” colonies in the Antipodes. Among them were the so-called “Wakefield” colonies of South Australia and New Zealand. The town plans of these settlements differed markedly from their Asian antecedents. One notable distinction was the pattern of dispersed “Native Reserves” planned for the colonial capitals of Adelaide and Wellington. This resulted from a remarkable, though short-lived, experiment in spatial assimilation of indigenous populations.

## “WAKEFIELD” COLONIES

Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s system of colonization aimed to ship Britain’s “surplus” population to laboring jobs in Australia and New Zealand. In itself, this idea was not new. Since the early eighteenth century, charities and governments had offered assisted passages to Britain’s colonies. However, these were small scale initiatives which often failed because of inadequate resources. Wakefield’s scheme was different. Revenue from the sale of colonial land was used exclusively to fund a massive programme of emigration. The plan also reflected an emerging understanding of the principles of capitalism, in particular, the theories of Adam Smith. By keeping the price of colonial land high, Wakefield believed he could produce the optimum combination of land, capital and labor and guarantee economic success for the new settlements. Wakefield and his supporters also argued that the correct mix of land owners and “respectable” working poor would produce a strong social foundation for the new colonies.

Wakefield took little direct interest in town planning, and his principles of colonization do not attempt to match these innovative social and economic objectives with explicit features of urban form. Commenting on this omission, the South Australian historian Robert Cheesman identifies a time lag between mid-nineteenth century developments in the theory of political economy and comparable progress in town planning.<sup>2</sup> Adding to this disjuncture is the fact that the layouts of many towns were left to colonial surveyors from conservative military backgrounds. Their plans were frequently derived from well-established seventeenth or eighteenth century precedents. Anachronisms were preserved despite profound shifts from religious to secular communities and from small, mercantile economies to large-scale capitalist ventures. Typically, mid-nineteenth century colonial town plans were characterised by “ideal”

geometries which no longer had a meaningful connection to belief systems or social and economic structures.

However, in some respects the Wakefield towns were distinctive and even unique. The original plans of Adelaide and Wellington promoted property speculation and private ownership of land rather than large acquisitions by government or religious institutions. In both cities, “Town Acre” lots were separated from surrounding “suburban” or rural properties by a broad expanse of open space. The “Parklands” at Adelaide and the “Town Belt” around Wellington are two of the earliest examples of urban green belts dedicated to public recreation and amenity.<sup>3</sup>

A second innovation in the layout of these two colonies is less well known. In both settlements, Wakefield’s associates attempted to disperse indigenous inhabitants among the settlers. Aborigines at Adelaide and Maori at Wellington were accommodated on a collection of small “Native Reserves” scattered throughout the European settlement. This policy of spatial assimilation was devised prior to the colonization of South Australia. Although it had little effect on the form of Adelaide, a more carefully considered version of the plan was systematically implemented at Wellington. In the New Zealand capital, one out of every ten “Town Acres” was reserved for Maori.

## ORIGINS OF THE ASSIMILATION POLICY

Given increasing racial segregation in other British colonies, why did the Wakefield experiment include such a radical and apparently “enlightened” policy of assimilation? A partial explanation may be found in British attitudes towards the first inhabitants of Australia and New Zealand. Because these indigenous populations were relatively small and scattered, neither Aborigines nor Maori were perceived as an impediment to the acquisition of land or a risk to the safety of colonists.<sup>4</sup> In fact, many of the protagonists of colonization perceived the Antipodes to be effectively uninhabited.

However, a second factor specific to the Wakefield system of colonization is equally important. Neither Aborigines nor Maori were assigned an economic role in plans for the new settlements.<sup>5</sup> Colonists did not need to rely on “native labor” to bring land into production because thousands of Britain’s poor were supplied as workers. For this reason, the Wakefield ventures could afford to marginalize indigenous populations in ways that had not been possible in earlier Asian colonies. In many respects, so far as land subdivision and ownership was concerned, the Wakefield system of colonization was more concerned to maintain relations between economic classes (i.e. capitalists and laborers) than it was to segregate the colonists from the indigenous inhabitants.<sup>6</sup>

Spatial assimilation formed a key part of this strategy and the colonists’ motives were far from benign. In many respects, the policy was intended to make the indigenous populations “invisible.”

It attempted to replace indigenous settlement forms and traditional land ownership patterns with structures which were indistinguishable from those which organized the European settlers.

The policy of spatial assimilation was the product of expediency and ad hoc decision-making. In 1834, the British Parliament authorised Wakefield's followers to establish a colony in South Australia. However, founding legislation made no reference to the Australian Aborigines. The British Colonial Office and the newly formed Colonization Commission for South Australia were forced to correct this omission. The original Act was amended to ensure that "the Commissioners alone shall have a right to treat with the natives for the purchase of lands reserved to them".<sup>7</sup> A "Protector of the Aborigines" was appointed to "protect [their] interests". The Commissioners gave this official only "a few general instructions", but they made it clear that Aborigines were to remain undisturbed unless they volunteered to relinquish the title to their land. Aborigines who chose to leave their land were to be compensated with food, shelter, medical assistance and "moral and religious instruction".<sup>8</sup>

On its own, this policy was unremarkable. However, the Colonization Commission devised a second, more innovative mechanism for compensating displaced Aborigines. Under this arrangement, one fifth of each 80 acre farm (16 acres) would remain in Aboriginal ownership. During the early life of the settlement, purchasers of the remaining 64 acre blocks would have free use of the reserves. The farmers' period of tenure remained unspecified. However, it would be long enough to justify bringing the reserved land into production. When the time came for the reserves to revert to Aboriginal use, each of the 80 acre parcels would be divided into five equal parts. The proprietors would have first and second choice from among these portions and the Aborigines, or their representatives, would have the third choice. The balance of the land would automatically remain with the proprietors. In this way, the purchasers would have certainty about where to place valuable permanent improvements such as buildings. However, the owners could not predict which portions would be relinquished and therefore could not afford to neglect parts of the land.<sup>9</sup>

### FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ASSIMILATION IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

The policy affected rural land, not the town site, and it was only applied to land auctioned in South Australia. The latter qualification was made to appease a group of privileged investors, those who bought "Preliminary Purchase Orders" in London prior to the first expedition. The "Preliminary Purchasers" held entitlements to the best land in the colony and these could not be compromised by the reserves policy.<sup>10</sup> So, almost from its inception, the reserves proposal excluded Aborigines from the most favourable locations in the new territory. Settlers were given the first claim to fertile areas for agriculture and profitable sites for speculation. Europeans also retained a monopoly on urban land. As a result, no Aboriginal reserves were made in or around Adelaide.

There was another serious flaw in the reserves plan. It failed to explain how displaced Aborigines should survive until the reserves became available and began to generate income. It seems likely that landless Aborigines were expected to become wage laborers or work at "asylums" in exchange for food and shelter.<sup>11</sup> Some commentators have suggested that Aborigines were not meant to return to the land at all. Instead, their reserves were to be leased to provide an endowment for "native" education and welfare.<sup>12</sup> However, the Commissioners made it clear that at least some of the residual 16 acres blocks were to be farmed by Aborigines. In fact, the Commission saw virtue in dispersing Aborigines among the settlers. Commissioners believed this would benefit the Aborigines by exposing them to the "civilizing" influence of the Europeans.<sup>13</sup>

Although it was defined in explicit detail, the reserves policy was never put into effect. The Colonial Office and the Commissioners




Fig. 1. Maori settlement at Port Nicholson, prior to 1840. A box locates the future site of Wellington. (Alexander Turnbull Library).

expected that a local legislature would be formed in South Australia and they assumed that this body would pass laws to formalize the process for reserving land. These events did not occur. Officials in London also naively misjudged settlers' attitudes towards the Aborigines. The prevailing opinion in Australian colonial society was that the Aborigines' seasonal migrations, hunting and gathering lifestyle and low population density effectively negated their title to land. This view is illustrated in the following extract from a colonist's letter to the Colonial Secretary in London: "I confess myself at a loss to understand how a few strolling savages, very few in comparison to the extent of the country, entirely ignorant of the arts of civilized life, and not only without the means but *averse* to cultivating the land...can be called proprietors" (emphasis added).<sup>14</sup>

The letter reveals another popular and persuasive argument against "native title." "Unimproved" land was an affront to the values of settler society and many colonists believed that Aborigines were unwilling to develop the full productive potential of their reserves. In 1840, a group of colonists complained about the reserves policy. Major Sturt, head of the Land Office in South Australia, rebuked the protestors and rejected their claims that the settlers were being disadvantaged. His reply provides an insight into official attitudes toward Aboriginal land:

It is scarcely necessary for the Governor to mention that prior to the landing of the first British settlers the Natives possessed well understood and distinctly defined proprietary rights over the whole of the available lands of the province...In the degree of knowledge which [the Aborigines] have attained it would however have been to them a great disadvantage to have entered into formal treaties with [the settlers] for the cession of lands, in as much as such lands would certainly have been obtained for the most insignificant and ill defined returns. The course which the Governor and Resident Commissioner has preferred to take is that of directing the Protector of the Aborigines to select such land for them in moderation as he may deem likely to be necessary for their future use support and advancement in civilization such land being secured in the Governor and Council and Protector of the Aborigines [as] trustees.<sup>15</sup>

The dispute continued and, some time later, Sturt wrote:

The Invasion of these ancient rights by surveys and land appropriations of any kind, is justifiable only on the ground that we should, at the same time, reserve for the Natives an ample sufficiency for their present [and] future use [and] comfort, under the new state of things into which they are




Fig. 2. Plan of Wellington, 1840. "Native Reserves" are coloured green. (Alexander Turnbull Library).

thrown. A state in which we hope they will be led to live in greater comfort on a small space, than they enjoyed before on these extensive original possessions.<sup>16</sup>

Sturt's vague and equivocal comments suggest that the ambitious reserves policy had already been abandoned. Reserves were set aside but the results were haphazard and far less generous than those anticipated by the Commissioners. The final pattern of Aboriginal land around Adelaide bore no resemblance to the dispersed 16 acre blocks described in London. However, the concept of spatial integration was clear and this idea was revived three years later when the New Zealand Company made plans for the next Wakefield colony.<sup>17</sup>

### EXPERIMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND

The Company's directors could not pretend that New Zealand was uninhabited. Maori were not numerous, but they held a recognised title to the site of the future colony.<sup>18</sup> This fact presented Wakefield and his associates with a dilemma. The New Zealand Company espoused the principles of capitalism, and these relied on respect for property rights. Along with capital and labor, creating a free market in land with guarantees of secure ownership was one of the first priorities for establishing a colonial economy. For this reason, and to satisfy the British Government, the founders of Wakefield's New Zealand colonies needed to place a gloss of legality and fairness over the extinction of "native title". Creating this illusion posed serious problems. The Wakefield system relied

on the acquisition of land at little or no cost because all of the proceeds from on-selling were needed to fund emigration. Moreover, once Maori land had been alienated, possession had to be taken and maintained without the threat of force. This was necessary because the British Government initially distanced itself from the Wakefield ventures and refused to provide a significant military presence.

The problem of acquiring a valid title to land was most acute in the towns. Speculation was a major attraction for investors, and most settlers hoped to acquire prime blocks of urban land along with their rural holdings. However, in many cases, the most valuable locations were already occupied by Maori. This was no coincidence. Indigenous and colonizing societies shared common specifications for favourable settlement sites: a sheltered anchorage, fresh water, and flat accessible land for intensive cultivation. Indeed, settlers favoured sites which had already been cleared by their indigenous owners.

These challenges may have attracted the directors of the New Zealand Company to the radical plan for "native reserves" tried unsuccessfully in South Australia. When their first settlement was established at Port Nicholson (now Wellington), the Company adopted a similar policy. It set aside one tenth of all land in the settlement for Maori. This was half the area proposed for Aborigines in South Australia, although the New Zealand Company's scheme included "Town Acres" as well as "Country Sections."

These reserves must have appeared equitable, and even benevolent, by the standards of the day. The Company proudly promoted the concept in correspondence with the Colonial Office, and with




Fig. 3. Plan of Nelson, 1842. "Native Reserves" are coloured green. (Land Information New Zealand).

churches and philanthropic societies which served as self-appointed advocates for "Native interests." Much was made of the fact that Maori land would be selected in exactly the same manner as properties purchased by the first settlers. "Purchasers of Preliminary Land Orders" drew lots to determine their place in an "Order of Choice" and the Company included Maori in this ballot.<sup>19</sup>

In fact, the reserves policy helped to mask inequalities and hardships which followed the extinction of "native title". Although the Company entered into formal purchase contracts with Maori at Port Nicholson, officials made little attempt to verify ownership or obtain informed consent to these deals. The British ascribed a "feudal" system of land tenure to Maori, and the New Zealand Company's agents restricted negotiations to several local "chiefs" assuming, incorrectly, that these individuals had unlimited power to dispose of the district's land. As a result, the purchase agreements disregarded the complex pattern of tribal boundaries, customary rights and the spiritual associations which Maori had with particular sites. Little or no recognition was given to existing settlements and cultivation (Fig.1). Indeed, the Company expected Maori to vacate their villages and gardens, and to accept the British concept of land as an exchangeable and even abstract commodity. Moreover, the

price paid for Maori land was pitifully small and bore no relation the re-sale value anticipated by the Company.

All these criticisms were raised in 1840, the year Port Nicholson was founded. Invariably, the directors of the New Zealand Company responded by arguing that the real compensation paid to Maori was the appreciation in land value brought about by systematic colonisation according to Wakefield's model. Through the mechanism of the "Native Reserves," Maori were to benefit from the same combination of land, capital and emigrant labour which would harness the full productive potential of the settlers' estates. By extension, Maori would also participate in the speculative gambles which attracted many British investors to the New Zealand venture.

**"WELLINGTON TENTHS"**

Urban land was part of this economic equation. Wellington was laid out with 1100 "Town Acres." 110 of these were selected as "Native Reserves" and became known as the "Wellington Tenths." Lots were chosen by the Company's Surveyor General. He attempted to include existing "pah," villages and gardens, but many of these sites occupied strategic locations which were also sought by




Fig. 4. Plan of Canterbury, c.1851. "Native Reserves" are colored green. (Alexander Turnbull Library).

the settlers.<sup>20</sup> The "Order of Choice" ensured that many intensively occupied areas passed into the colonists' hands. The overall layout of the reserves reflects the inherent constraints of the selection process. Many of the reserved parcels are clustered together, but these attempts to consolidate property could only be achieved in peripheral locations where choice was uncontested. The remaining one-acre lots are scattered throughout the town (Fig.2).

The dispersed reserves may be seen as an attempt to "divide and rule" rather than a conscious step toward assimilation. However, it is clear that the Company intended Maori to conform to the same social and economic classes which organised European colonial society, i.e. those of property owner and wage laborer. It was assumed that local Maori chiefs and their families would become the effective owners of the "Native Reserves." The Company proposed establishing agricultural schools for the sons of Maori chiefs. If this plan had been put into effect, heirs to the reserves would have learned how to manage their future estates profitably in the European manner.<sup>21</sup> Maori were also expected to acquire agricultural skills by "osmosis," i.e. by following the example of their British neighbours. The Company regarded this informal tuition as an important benefit of its reserves policy. So, although some Native Reserves were immediately leased to generate income, the Company intended Maori to occupy and develop most of their land themselves. The majority of Maori, who were not members of the chiefly class, were destined to become wage labourers under the Wakefield system. This paralleled the fate of South Australian Aborigines who were expected to work for food and clothing once they had been dispossessed of their land.

The reserves policy briefly became contentious when the Govern-

nor of the colony accused the New Zealand Company of choosing Maori land unfairly.<sup>22</sup> However, the "Native Reserves" were widely accepted among the colonists at Wellington. This response may reflect self-interest rather than eagerness to accept Maori as full participants in the colonization venture. The reserves allowed the Company to declare Maori villages and gardens redundant, and to make them available for sale and settlement by Europeans.

The policy of spatial assimilation met great resistance from Maori. Local tribes fought prolonged legal battles to retain possession of their villages, burial grounds and gardens. In 1843, the British Government sent a commissioner to Wellington to adjudicate these disputes. Some were decided in favour of Maori and a number of strategic sites were returned to them. However, the commissioner recognised the bulk of the New Zealand Company's purchases at Port Nicholson. In response, the Government established legal titles to these by issuing a "Crown Grant" to the Company. The "Native Reserves" also received official sanction. Although they were excluded from the Company's grant, they retained their identity and became the direct responsibility of the Colonial Government.<sup>23</sup>

### REVERSION TO SPATIAL SEGREGATION

In 1841, the "Tenths" also appeared in two other Wakefield settlements. Nelson was the second of the New Zealand Company's Cook Strait colonies, and its principal town displayed the characteristic pattern of dispersed "Native Reserves" first seen at Wellington (Fig.3). The second example was New Plymouth, established by the Plymouth Company in the Taranaki district of New Zealand's North Island.<sup>24</sup> Here, the question of land ownership was particularly vexed and, three years after the settlement was founded, the Colonial Government declared that the Company's title to land was substantially invalid. To remedy the situation, the Governor confined settlers to a smaller tract of land and replaced the original pattern of dispersed "Native Reserves" with fewer large blocks.<sup>25</sup>

By the time the next Wakefield colonies were founded, the reserves policy had been abandoned altogether. Otago was permanently established in 1846, and Canterbury was formed four years later. Neither settlement contained the distinctive "Tenths", and plans for the towns of Dunedin and Christchurch made no provision for Maori. Instead, an early map of Canterbury suggests a return to conventional strategies for segregating indigenous inhabitants. "Native Reserves" were consolidated in two locations, north and south of the main settlement. Each reserve was separated from the colonists by distance and by natural barriers such as hills and rivers (Fig.4).

Otago and Canterbury were both settled by "Associations" affiliated with the New Zealand Company. Wakefield and his London associates were less involved with planning these two colonies, and this detachment may explain changes to the reserves policy. However, a second factor is potentially more significant. After 1843, New Zealand's indigenous settlement pattern received a degree of protection: the Colonial Government prevented the New Zealand Company, or its affiliates, from acquiring inhabited sites. When this regulation took effect, the "Tenths" no longer provided significant benefits to the colonists. Once strategically placed paha, villages and gardens were secure, the New Zealand Company showed little interest in endowing Maori with additional reserves of urban or rural land. On the contrary, it encouraged the Company to locate settlers on "vacant" sites, and must have helped direct colonization to the sparsely-populated South Island where the fiction of "waste" land was more easily sustained.

### CONCLUSION

Spatial assimilation of indigenous people was a brief and largely ineffective experiment in the Wakefield colonies. Nevertheless, it provides an intriguing insight into nineteenth century British colo-

nization. The reserves policies, as they were applied in South Australia and New Zealand, help to illustrate the complex motives of the "land companies" and their programs for assisted emigration.

During the 1830's and 1840's, new settlements were being planned and promoted by an unlikely alliance of property speculators and philanthropists. The "Tenths" promised to reconcile the conflicting interests of the protagonists. Through the mechanism of the reserves, Aborigines and Maori were invited to participate in the growth and prosperity of the settlements. From a spatial point of view, at least, the indigenous inhabitants were to become indistinguishable from the European colonists. Furthermore, this seemingly equitable arrangement was achieved at negligible cost to investors. On the contrary, it helped the colonization companies justify "nominal" payments for land, and it provided them with a pretext for displacing Aborigines and Maori from all but a few of the most valuable sites. So, for speculators and philanthropists, the "Tenths" offered an attractive alternative to segregation.

Although the Wakefield experiment appealed to a broad coalition of British interests, it failed to take account of the needs or wishes of indigenous people. In fact, the "Tenths" offered Aborigines and Maori little choice but to accept assigned places within a new, distinctly European concept of spatial organization. In this respect, the innovative pattern of dispersed "Native Reserves" was no less coercive than earlier attempts to sequester the indigenous inhabitants of British colonies.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

Abbreviations used in the references:

**CO** - Colonial Office record group, Public Record Office, London

**GRG** - Government Record Group, South Australian State Archives, Adelaide

**PRG** - Public Record Group, Mortlock Library, Adelaide

**NZC** - New Zealand Company record group, New Zealand National Archives, Wellington

<sup>1</sup> Anthony Douglas King's analysis of British colonial town planning in India suggests there were two established practices for dealing with indigenous populations, either to sequester them in a separate "Native" section of the town or to exclude them from urban settlements altogether. These and other policies typically led to the bifurcation of colonial urban form. See Anthony King, *Colonial Urban Development* (London: Routledge, 1976), pp. 22-40.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Cheesman, *Patterns in Perpetuity* (Adelaide: Thornton House, 1986), pp. 99-111.

<sup>3</sup> The precedent was still noteworthy when Ebenezer Howard wrote *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*. Howard quotes the Adelaide plan in his book, although he incorrectly assumes that one of the main purposes of the Parklands was to constrain urban expansion. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>4</sup> Promotional literature for the South Australian venture helped to create these impressions. In 1835, the Colonization Commissioners for South Australia, published *New Colony in South Australia: Principles of Colonization*. This pamphlet included the following reassuring description of Australian Aborigines: "The natives of Australia are a feeble [race], and when treated with kindness, they have proved an inoffensive people...the laws of the colony will require that they should be treated in every respect as fellow-men". PRG Series 5, Item 269, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> In practice, it took years for imported capital and immigrant labour to bring colonial land into production. During this period, New Zealand's first settlers were dependent on trade with Maori.

<sup>6</sup> Assisted emigrants were discouraged from purchasing land and becoming farmers. To achieve this, the price of land was maintained at an artificially high level. When Wakefield devised his plan for "systematic" colonization, he estimated that it would

take several years for the average laborer to acquire enough capital to become self-sufficient as a property owner.

<sup>7</sup> Minutes of the Amendment Committee, 14 May 1836, GRG 48 Series 3, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> Hill to Fisher, 8 October 1836, GRG 48 Series 1, pp. 20-21.

<sup>9</sup> Two documents state that the Commissioners were "considering" dispersed reserves for Aborigines. The first account, dated 18 February 1836, is provided by the Secretary to the Colonization Commissioners, Rowland Hill, in a memorandum entitled *Plan for a Surveying Expedition*, CO 13 Series 1. The proposal is also referred to in the *First Annual Report of the Colonization Commissioners for South Australia*, 14 June 1836, CO 13 Series 1.

<sup>10</sup> R. J. Rudall, *Foundation of South Australia* (manuscript), p. 150, PRG 210, R. J. Rudall Papers Box 1.

<sup>11</sup> Some accommodation for Aborigines was eventually provided within Adelaide itself. In January 1838, the "Protector of the Aborigines" wrote to the Resident Commissioner asking for funds to purchase a town property, and the house standing on it, to provide accommodation for a "family" of Aborigines. The property was to be fenced, the house was to become a school and store, and six to ten huts were to be constructed to provide dwellings. See Wyatt to Resident Commissioner, 29 Jan 1838, GRG 35 Series 211, p. 39.

<sup>12</sup> R. J. Rudall *Foundation of South Australia* (manuscript), p. 65, PRG 210 R. J. Rudall Papers Box 1.

<sup>13</sup> *First Annual Report of the Colonization Commissioners for South Australia*, 14 June 1836, CO 13 Series 1.

<sup>14</sup> R. J. Rudall *Foundation of South Australia* (manuscript), p. 64, PRG 210 R. J. Rudall Papers Box 1.

<sup>15</sup> Sturt to Morphet (et al.), 11 July 1840, GRG 35 Series 230, pp. 199-200.

<sup>16</sup> Sturt to McLaren (et al.), 17 July 1840, GRG Series 230, p. 207.

<sup>17</sup> During the 1840's, the principal agent of colonization in New Zealand was a limited stock company called the "New Zealand Company" (previously known as the "New Zealand Colonization Company" and the "New Zealand Land Company").

<sup>18</sup> Britain's official position was that Maori had proprietary rights over the "North Island" but the "South (or Middle) Island" became a Crown possession by "discovery". The latter claim was contentious. However, all parties agreed that the first Wakefield colony was established on land already owned and occupied by Maori.

<sup>19</sup> The Company's agent argued that the purpose of the reserves "as made public by the Secretary Mr. Ward [was] that they should be made in the same way, in the same allotments and to the same effect as if the reserved lands had been purchased from the Company on behalf of the natives." See Wills to W. Wakefield, 4 April 1846, NZC 110 Item 1, No. 137.

<sup>20</sup> A "pah" (or "pa") is a fortified Maori settlement.

<sup>21</sup> The minutes of a "Special Committee" meeting record that "systematic education of the Native Youth is indispensable, if it be intended that the Sons of the present race of Chiefs should be rendered competent to manage with advantage, & to the general benefit of the Aborigines, the lands which have been reserved for them..." Apparently no thought was given to including tuition on the management and development of the town reserves. See Minutes of Committees Vol. 2, c. December 1840, CO 208 Item 185, p. 173.

<sup>22</sup> The colonial administration claimed that the reserves contained an insufficient area of land suitable for cultivation or pasture. In reply, the Company argued that many of the settlers faced similar limitations and that, once Maori introduced European agriculture, the reserves would be more than adequate for their needs. Towards the end of 1842, 109 rural "Native Reserves" had been selected, yet fewer than half of these (45) were at Port Nicholson. The remainder were in Horowhenua and Manawatu (37), and at

Wanganui (27). It is not clear to what extent Maori in one district were “compensated” with land in another location. However the Company initially had little understanding of the geographical distribution of various tribes and sub-tribes. See *Number of Native Reserves chosen* (report), c. September 1842, NZC 110 Item 1, No. 45.

<sup>23</sup> The Government proved to be a poor guardian of this resource. The New Zealand Company made few public reserves in Wellington and, as early as 1848, the Crown began to appropriate “Native Reserves” for “ordnance purposes” such as hospitals,

churches and public offices. Some of this land subsequently passed into private ownership. The process is described by Mr. A. MacKay, Under Secretary for the Native Department, in *Origin of the New Zealand Company's “Tenths” Native Reserves*, a memorandum presented to both Houses of the New Zealand General Assembly, in July 1873. See pp. 14-15.

<sup>24</sup> The Plymouth Company was an affiliate of the New Zealand Company. The two companies later merged.

<sup>25</sup> Charles Hursthouse (Jun.), *An Account of the Settlement of New Plymouth* (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1975), pp. 41-48.