

The Uses of Architecture in Frankfurt School Thought

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Theodor Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*,¹ published posthumously in 1970, is nothing short of an attempt to formulate a comprehensive theory for advanced artistic production in the late twentieth century. Although it is, "as a whole, a response"² to Walter Benjamin's 1936 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,"³ it was forty-three years in gestation, and in both length and opacity it is quite unlike Benjamin's famous essay on the effect of technological reproduction on the "aura" of the work of art. Adorno's response to Benjamin began in private letters in 1936, when he read the essay in its second draft, and continued into 1969, when he completed *Aesthetic Theory*, shortly before his death. While the intervening period was one of great historical and personal change, Adorno certainly continued to see "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" as setting the fundamental terms of the contemporary discourse on art. He undoubtedly regarded *Aesthetic Theory* as the mirror pair to Benjamin's essay.⁴

Neither text pays any particular attention to architecture. Although the experience of architectural space figures prominently elsewhere in Benjamin's writing, architecture features in the "Work of Art . . ." essay only as an apparent digression. As for Adorno, aside from the lecture "Functionalism Today," of 1965, architecture figures barely at all in his writing, either in *Aesthetic Theory* or before it.⁵ Yet if architecture is not prominent in either Benjamin's essay or Adorno's book, it nevertheless plays an instrumental role, for it offers something particular that lacks an analogue in other artistic fields.

We understand, as Adorno did, that Benjamin's essay offered not only a critique of the auratic element of art but a program for a new kind of art altogether: an art of neither unique objects nor ritualized reception, a "transportable" art adapted to new techniques of distribution. The new work of art was intended for a

general audience — was an art in which everyone was equally expert. It was not just suited to the processes of mass reproduction but commensurate with them. Not all modes of artmaking, according to Benjamin, were equally suited to this task: painting, for example, was simply "in no position to present an object for simultaneous collective experience, as was possible for architecture at all times . . . and for the movie today."⁶ Put differently, architecture was analogous to the new art not because it could be produced *en masse* but because it could be received *en masse*.

In addition, Benjamin writes, architecture offered a historical precedent for the power of an alternative means of artistic reception, and a demonstration of such a phenomenon:

A man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it. . . . In contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the work of art. This is most obvious with regard to buildings. Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction. The laws of its reception are most instructive.

Buildings have been man's companions since primeval times. Many art forms have developed and perished. . . . But the human need for shelter is lasting. Architecture has never been idle. Its history is more ancient than that of any other art, and its claim to being a living force has significance in every attempt to comprehend the relationship of the masses to art. Buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception — or rather, by touch and sight. Such appropriation cannot be understood in terms of the attentive concentration of a tourist before a famous building. On the tactile side there is no counterpart to contemplation on the optical side. Tactile appropri-

ation is accomplished not so much by attention as habit. As regards architecture, habit determines to a large extent even optical reception. The latter, too, occurs much less through rapt attention than by noticing the object in an incidental fashion.⁷

Given the authority that architecture lends to this passage, it is surprising to realize that Benjamin's preliminary notes for a theory of distracted reception contain no reference to either buildings or architecture.⁸ Just as surprising is the realization that, in a traditional sense, what is being discussed here is hardly architecture at all: as a spatial and locally perceived definition of architecture, the passage lacks equally in the address of style, composition, hierarchical order, and monumentality—it is atectonic in the extreme. Architecture here is not something you look at, it is something that happens to you, and is important because it does. Appropriated by chance and through touch, it offers an experience of artistic work that parallels the experience of history:

This [distracted] mode of appropriation, developed with reference to architecture, in certain circumstances acquires canonical value. For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the guidance of tactile appropriation.

. . . Since . . . individuals are tempted to avoid such tasks, art will tackle the most difficult and important ones.⁹

Significantly, Benjamin intended "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" to develop a theory "completely useless for the purposes of Fascism . . . [but] useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the politics of art."¹⁰ One might suppose, then, on reading this passage, that architecture was somehow immune to fascism—that our habituation to the environment was somehow beyond fascism's taint. Today I think it would be hard to find a critic who would agree with this assertion, and certainly Adorno did not, perhaps owing to personal experience.

Between 1925 and 1930 Adorno's hometown of Frankfurt was the site of a massive effort in the construction of workers' housing. Under the guidance of city architect Ernst May, 15,000 such units were constructed in the city—90 percent of all housing built there during the period.¹¹ May insisted on efficiency in both planning and construction, leading to the establishment of "existence-minimum" spatial standards—which aimed

to provide for the basic human needs within the minimum possible space—and such "innovations" as built-in storage, foldaway beds, and the famously efficient "*Frankfurter Küche*" (Frankfurt kitchen). Volumetric expression was decidedly (and prototypically) *Sachlichkeit*, with flat roofs, stuccoed polychrome walls, and mass-produced windows.¹² Adorno described such housing units as "living cases manufactured by experts for philistines . . . devoid of all relation to the occupant."¹³ Their fixtures, he said, "demand of their users already the violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment."¹⁴ His knowledge of these buildings as real things may well have been a source of his quarrel with *Sachlichkeit* culture, which he critiques in *Aesthetic Theory*, beginning with a discussion of architecture:

The critique of *Sachlichkeit* as a form of reified consciousness must not . . . result in the restoration of an allegedly free fantasy and thus of the element of expression. Functionalism today, prototypically in architecture, would need to push construction so far that it would win expression through the rejection of traditional and semitraditional forms. Great architecture gains its suprafunctional language when it works directly from its purposes, effectively announcing them mimetically as the work's content. H. B. Scharoun's Philharmonic Hall in Berlin is beautiful because, in order to create the ideal spatial conditions for orchestral music, it assimilates itself to these conditions rather than borrowing from them. By expressing its purpose through the building, it transcends mere purposiveness though, incidentally, this transition is never guaranteed to purposive forms. *Neue Sachlichkeit's* condemnation of expression and all mimesis as ornamental and superfluous, as arbitrary subjective garnishing, holds true only for construction provided with a veneer of expression, not for works of absolute expression. Absolute expression would be objective, the object itself. The phenomenon of aura . . . is not only—as Benjamin claimed—the here and now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its factual givenness, its content; one cannot abolish it and still want art.¹⁵

We notice in this passage, first, that architecture is pinioned between the *Sachlichkeit* and Benjamin's concept of aura, but also, second, that architecture is not an abstraction, it is Scharoun's Berlin Philharmonie. This exemplary architecture exists in the world as a complex manifestation of techniques ("push[ed] construction"), functional realization ("purposiveness"), and art; it attains the coherence of "language." We might also notice that Adorno in this passage somewhat

remarkably downplays reception, for while the architecture “transcends mere purposiveness . . . this transition is never guaranteed.”

In terms of epistemology, then, the architecture of Benjamin’s “Work of Art . . .” essay is *perceived* and that of Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* is *made*. Accordingly we might suppose that, as both authors attempt to articulate a general theory of the artwork, their theories would prove not so much in competition as complementary; and this would suggest an interesting proposition for architectural discourse, since for all the independent strength of these two theories, their independent “use” leads to irreconcilable contradictions. Further, if architecture can provide the means of their synthesis, it may not only open a way to overcome a historical impasse but offer insight into the theory of the artwork. And in doing so it may suggest both means and aspirations for architecture as a politically motivated practice—a constructed artifact, perceived, as Benjamin says, in “apperception.”

In describing the Philharmonie, Adorno focuses implicitly on the performance space, where the lapidary accumulation of tiers of audience seating is arranged on all sides of the orchestral stage. Scharoun, the hall’s architect, described the space as one in which

you will find no segregation of “producers” and “consumers” but rather a community of listeners grouped around an orchestra in the most natural of all seating arrangements. Thus, despite its size, the auditorium has retained a certain intimacy, enabling direct and co-creative share in the production of music. Here the . . . design was inspired by the very purpose it serves. Man, music and space together in a new relationship.¹⁶

As Adorno states, Scharoun’s building “assimilates” itself to orchestral music: by placing the orchestra at the center, literally among the audience members, it reinvents the typology of the hall to more correctly reflect what he saw as the ideal spatial conditions for concerts. While it effects no *real* reformation of the production of music, performers do comment on the challenges of playing in an environment that insists on a different sort of intimacy between audience and orchestra.¹⁷ It is worth noting that the design is both unfamiliar and familiar; although it lacks the traditional proscenium, it reflects, as Scharoun notes, the spontaneous self-organization of a crowd whenever music is played. The erratic geometries and mesmerizing space of the hall are balanced by a rhetorical (and acoustically fortuitous) lateral symmetry. Nothing in architecture is more familiar than symmetry, and its presence in this space has an

effect opposite to that of the alienation effect in the theater of Bertolt Brecht: it assuages the initial sense of surprise by offering something familiar. The purposes that are “announced mimetically as the work’s content” are mimetic of neither music nor its production but of its transmission to its audience.

Reading Scharoun’s intentions carefully, then, one understands that his emphasis lies not on the critique of musical “producers” and “consumers” but on the creation of a community among them. It is here that his intention matches Adorno’s. However, in a text so scanty in concrete examples as *Aesthetic Theory*, it seems unlikely that Adorno would commit so decisively to the Philharmonie if that building did not raise other sympathies. At its core, his book is concerned with arriving at a universal theory of contemporary artistic practice in which, as Fredric Jameson writes, the artwork is “social and nonsocial all at once—or better still, social through and through by virtue of its very antisociality”¹⁸:

The process that transpires in artworks and is brought to a standstill in them, is to be conceived as the same social process in which the artworks are embedded; according to Leibniz’s formulation, they represent this process windowlessly. The elements of an artwork acquire their configuration as a whole in obedience to immanent laws that are related to those of the society external to it. Social forces of production, as well as relations of production, return in artworks as mere forms divested of their facticity.¹⁹

For Adorno, clearly, the movement of the elements of the artwork toward the whole²⁰ determines not only the autonomy of the work but also its societal basis. The artwork as monad—“Leibniz’s formulation”—does not abstain from society’s historical formations but takes them over and transforms them, “crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself.”²¹ Aesthetic experience is tied to the apprehension of these productive forces. Adorno’s early enthusiasm for the music of Arnold Schoenberg seems the direct result of this sort of experience: he heard within the music a compositional structure analogous to “that which in Marx is called the ‘association of free men.’”²²

Adorno makes no attempt to define the “elements” or materials of art, but by implication they may be either given by tradition or derived in unprecedented ways from norms, codes, and other realms.²³ The simple assembly of elements, however, is insufficient: art must strive for “totalization” by means of the principles of “construction,” which, of historical necessity, has super-

seded montage as the *modus operandi* of advanced artistic production.

The principle of montage was conceived as an act against a surreptitiously achieved organic unity; it was meant to shock. Once the shock was neutralized, the assemblage once more becomes merely indifferent material; the technique no longer suffices to trigger communication between the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic and its interest dwindles to a cultural-historical curiosity.²⁴

[T]he principle of montage therefore became that of construction. There is no denying that even in the principle of construction, in the dissolution of materials and their subordination to an imposed unity, once again something smooth, harmonistic, a quality of pure logicity, is conjured up that seeks to establish itself as ideology. . . . Still, construction is the only possible form that the rational artwork can take.²⁵

Adorno's agenda has little to do with any doctrine of "constructivism" but focuses on the transformative nature of assembly within artistic production, dialectically understood. The principle of harmony, for example, may tend to be insular, but as an active principle of art it must also contain its inverse: "Dissonance is the truth about harmony."²⁶

As Jameson points out, Adorno's aesthetics displace meaning in the traditional semantic sense, replacing it with an emphasis on forces of production. Deprived of the referent of tradition, meaning as such comes and goes, and is in any case unnecessary. Construction is seen as a means by which to displace meaning, and to substitute for it the image of reified forces of production within the unified whole, where they appear as unalienated labor. To uphold the principle of construction is "an attempt to bear up under the suffering of alienation by outstripping alienation in the parameters of a nonrepressive application rationality."²⁷ While the forces of production that appear within the construction model derive from those of the world, they are not equivalent to them. As we have seen, Adorno maintains that there is a structural similarity between the productive principle in the artwork and the image of society that the work projects. A work that cannot escape the repressive totality of the world can still — in fact must — hold out the image of some better state of the world to come. This offering, which determines the work's truth-value, is linked to a projected ideal future:

The question about the possible truth of an object that is made is, however, nothing less than that

other question about aesthetic appearance and about its possible redemption as the appearance of truth itself. Truth content, however, cannot be constructed. All making in art is one long struggle to say what that made object itself can never be and what art itself can never know. . . . this is where the idea of art as the restoration of a repressed nature submerged in the dynamics of history comes in. Nature, whose *imago* art aspires to be, does not yet exist; what is true in art is a nonexistent.²⁸

Art, for Adorno, holds out for the future something that "does not yet exist," a vision of the individual in a new state of unalienated nature. As Jameson explains, Adorno's "aesthetic experience . . . stands as a figure for a utopian existence that would not be dominated by instrumental motives and would above all be free of the ultimate 'end,' which is that of self-preservation."²⁹

Art, because it does not function, may be able to present the relations of a restored productive state or an ideal societal structure, but it does this negatively; it does not provide a model of actual relations within the restored state. To develop his idea of the transformative potential of artistic practice to bring about "that which is not yet," Adorno needs a backward link into the world, a real object on which to model the restored subject/object relation. This is best exemplified by the relationship of humanity to nature. In nature, things are just what they are. Further, when liberated from need and self-preservation, we perceive nature as the "appearance of the beautiful and not as an object to be acted upon."³⁰ Even in a fully reified world, the beautiful in art retains some trace of this relationship, as "suspended history" or "a cipher of the reconciled."³¹ Adorno describes this quality through reference to architecture:

Culturescapes . . . while acquiescing in the hegemony of urban life, . . . do not visibly bear the stigmata of market society. That is why the joy of seeing some old stone wall or cluster of medieval houses is spoiled by a guilty conscience. . . . As long as the face of the earth keeps being ravished by utilitarian pseudo-progress, it will turn out to be impossible to disabuse human intelligence of the notion that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the premodern world was better and more humane, its backwardness notwithstanding.³²

After the abolition of scarcity, any further expansion of productive forces should occur in a dimension that is different from the quantitative growth of production. There are intimations of this in functional buildings that have been adapted to

forms and lines of the surrounding landscape; or in old architecture where the raw materials for buildings were taken from the surrounding area, as is the case with many castles and chateaux. What is called “culture landscape” in German captures the possibilities of such beauty. Today such motifs might be taken up in a deliberate, rational manner in order to close some of the wounds that rationality has inflicted on nature.³³

Within *Aesthetic Theory*, then, in an image of the future that is also an image of the past, architecture is likened to nature, and functions as both origin and end, as the past model of future object production. Because it is “both autonomous and purpose-oriented,”³⁴ architecture constitutes a model for the backward link between autonomous art and the objects of the world:

The useful object would be the highest achievement, an anthropomorphized “thing,” the reconciliation with objects which are no longer closed off from humanity. . . . Childhood perception of technical things promises such a state; they appear as images of a near and helpful spirit, cleansed of profit motivation.³⁵

If in nature objects are what they are, then art holds out this demythified state and the promise of its truth content to all those who are capable of aesthetic experience. It is in this context that Adorno uses architecture within *Aesthetic Theory*, as the example of an object that pre- and postdates the commodity structure of industrial production. Benjamin does something similar in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” when he cites buildings as “man’s companions since primeval times.”

(Of course architecture risks being something like the ur-commodity—the first artifact, long preceding the industrial revolution, in whose production workers were truly alienated from their labor. This contradiction was not lost on Adorno.³⁶ As architecture moves closer to the commodity structure or to the articulation of power, it relinquishes its claims to the restorative potential that is part of its status as art.)

More than any other architectural work of the time, Scharoun’s Philharmonie epitomizes the subordination of conventional architectural elements to the goal of a unified whole. Rigorously eschewing both stylistic references (whether “traditional” or “semitraditional”) and contextual references to the city around it, the building attempts to establish a place for itself apart from the world. While it incorporates elements of industrial manufacture, for example, bricks, concrete, metal fabri-



cations, mass-produced window elements, it simultaneously prevents them from being read as such. Exterior surfaces—masonry, concrete and metal describe volume instead of stories. The white brick and the painted concrete seem to differ only in texture, while the metal, dimpled and iridescent, defies easy categorization. As in many works of modern architecture, fields of glazing become a language of transparent surfaces not only extending the implied space of the interior but also participating fully in the expression of the form. Other fenestration, the system of circular and inflected rectangular windows, are rendered as perforations, further redefining the parent mass. The Philharmonie’s “construction” *must* (by this schema) entail “the unmitigated subjection not only of all that comes from outside but also of all partial moments inherent in the artistic process.”³⁷ The apparently “functional” handling of the building’s elements—functional in the conventional sense, but also in the mimetic sense that Adorno identifies—transforms elevations (a social category) into sculptural massing (an artistic one). The erratic geometries of the plan, for example, “necessitate” sloping walls, and virtually all surfaces, glazed and opaque alike, are subject to manipulation. Such devices are not merely “compositional.” In a work that is by definition constructed, the distinction between compo-

sition and construction is a matter of motivation, and means.

A similar analysis could be applied to the interior spaces, where the rigorous choices of materials are again brought together by a logic not of order but of the unity of the whole. Submerged within a seemingly casual play of elements, the visitor perceives the symmetrical performance space as a sort of end or resolution. This hall not only offers reassuring evidence that within the cacophony of elements there is in fact a harmonizing intent, but offers a figure (in Adorno's language) of the "untruth of the repressive totality." "Where architecture plays the role of critic, it criticizes outmoded models of architecture. And where architecture is critical is in effecting a situation that cannot be accomplished otherwise: "Man, music and space," as Scharoun writes, joined "together in a new relationship."

Analogous effects occur not just in the orchestra hall but in other public spaces as well. The multilevel promenade between the lobby and the hall is perhaps the clearest example: visitors are directed along jibing and overlapping trajectories of movement, concretized in the stairs, balconies, and bridges. These surround and cross the lobby space below, which, with its configuration of open wardrobes and bars, is itself the locus of an elaborate choreography of meeting, eating, and grooming. The vastness of the space, the forms, even such celebratory elements such as stained glass are neither ostentatious nor tasteful but clearly special. The building offers the experience of a jubilant society, an experience at once grand and banal. In a highly differentiated space, visitors share an experience of community, but not the *same* experience.³⁸ An experience is created by architecture, but it is not an experience *of* architecture. It is, in fact, exactly the sort of distracted, and formative, experience that Benjamin sketched.

The example of the Philharmonie demonstrates that architecture, even by Adorno's definition, is perceived, *pace* Benjamin, in distraction. Analysis may lead back to the architecture's generative situation, but receivers cannot see what they do not understand, and their experience cannot reliably be read backward to the form's productive means. It is unlikely that Adorno understood the Philharmonie in the same way he understood the music of Schoenberg, but he was nevertheless able to recognize it as art, or nearly so. In order to hold out a model of unreified experience, experience approaching the natural, architecture must acknowledge spatial mimesis and material construction as mutually supportive. Building achieves the status of

architecture only as it strains toward just relations in both. Construction, in Adorno's sense of the word, may not rely on a flimsy creation of images, or on a montage of disintegrated images from the past. Just intentions are undersold by shoddy work; fascist tendencies are reinforced by an elegant deployment of means; faltering work will only yield pacifying moments in experience, which otherwise gives itself over to the brutality of the situation.

These criteria may be useful in distinguishing the experience of architecture from that of buildings (those rather banal things that are now largely the result of administrative or primarily economic processes). In the union of Benjamin's model of reception with Adorno's model of production, buildings and architecture differ not in reception but in production. Either may be *read* (or reread), but architecture must still be *made*—at every level, from the programmatic to the material, *especially* since it is to be perceived in distraction.

NOTES

¹ Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), and Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). Because the translations differ in clarity, passages from both are used in this paper.

² Hullot-Kentor, "Translator's Introduction," in Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor, xvi.

³ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 1936, in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (1968; revised, New York: Schocken, 1985), 217-64. Adorno saw parts of the first draft of the essay in January of 1936, by way of Max Horkheimer, and received a second draft from Benjamin in early March. See Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, *The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940*, ed. Henri Lonitz, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 122-134.

⁴ See Hullot-Kentor, "Translator's Introduction," p. xvi.

⁵ Adorno, "Functionalism Today," trans. Jane O. Newman and John H. Smith, *Oppositions* 17 (Summer 1979): 32-51. Adorno delivered the lecture to the German Werkbund, October 23, 1965.

⁶ Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 234-235.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁸ Benjamin, "Theory of Distraction," 1936, in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 3, 1935-1938*, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁹ Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 239-240.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 218.

¹¹ See Kenneth Frampton, *Modern Architecture: A Critical History*, rev. and enl. (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1990), 137.

¹² The term *Sachlichkeit*, in wide circulation in Germany in the 1920s, referred to a variety of cultural manifestations. The term *Neue Sachlichkeit* was coined in the early 1920s and was the title of an exhibition in Mannheim in 1925. The original translation of *Aesthetic Theory* identifies the *Neue Sachlichkeit* with "an anti-expressionist, veristic movement in German painting" (trans. Lenhardt, 500, note 26). The term has been most tenacious in architecture, and in *Aesthetic Theory* Adorno's discussion of *Sachlichkeit* art, "which

goes against its own nature and simply duplicates existence," returns to architecture again and again.

¹³ Adorno, "Refuge for the Homeless," in *Minimia Moralia, 1944-1947*, trans. E. F. N. Pephcott (New York: Verso, 1991), 38.

¹⁴ Adorno, "Do not knock," in *ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁵ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor, pp. 44-45.

¹⁶ Hans Scharoun, report on the Philharmonie, quoted in Peter Blundell Jones, *Hans Scharoun* (London: Phaidon, 1995), 178.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 221 and related notes. In particular, Blundell Jones cites Luciano Berio for the observation that the Philharmonie "reverses the tendency of the concert hall to become a museum;" Scharoun Symposium, Harvard Graduate School of Design, April 12, 1993.

¹⁸ Fredric Jameson, *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso, 1990), 177.

¹⁹ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor, 236.

²⁰ The earlier translation puts this concept more succinctly as the "configurative totalization of elements"; see Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Lenhardt, 335.

²¹ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor, 225.

²² Adorno, letter to Ernst Krenek, 1934, quoted in Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origins of Negative Dialectics* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1977), 130.

²³ This is made clear throughout Adorno's critical work. See also Hilde Heynen, *Architecture and Modernity: A Critique* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 188.

²⁴ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor, 155-56.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.

²⁷ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Lenhardt, 364.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 191. Quoted in Jameson, *Late Marxism*, 214.

²⁹ Jameson, *Late Marxism*, 225.

³⁰ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Lenhardt, 97.

³¹ Section headings, Table of Contents. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Hullot-Kentor.

³² Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Lenhardt, 95.

³³ *Ibid.*, 69-70.

³⁴ Adorno, "Functionalism Today," 38.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 38: "The people who really constitute the productive energies become deformed according to the measure of their working conditions. This fundamental contradiction is most clearly visible in architecture."

³⁷ Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Lenhardt, 84.

³⁸ For a more extensive discussion of the experience of attending the Philharmonie, as well as the importance of Scharoun as a figure in discussions of a political architecture in Germany at the time, see Blundell Jones, *Scharoun*, esp. 224-225.

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